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START TO FINISH: TOO MUCH "ROUTINE,"
NOT ENOUGH FOURTH AMENDMENT
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Yale Kamisar, about which I have said too much elsewhere in this
issue of the Review,1 could rightly be called "Mr. Confessions," for he
has not only authored books and a host of articles on the subject of
police interrogation, but for years has been printing Miranda cards in
his basement and selling them to police departments all across the
nation.2 Moreover, he may be the only law professor in the country

* David C. Baum Professor of Law Emeritus & Center for Advanced Study Professor
Emeritus, University of Illinois. B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965, University of Wisconsin.
Professor LaFave has advised us that his personal experience with traffic stops is limited,
as he has been stopped but once, about thirty-five years ago. He was stopped and ticketed
for speeding by a Madison, Wisconsin, officer while driving to the University of Wisconsin
law school to give a lecture entitled "Discretionary Enforcement by the Police"! - Ed.

1. See Wayne R. LaFave, "What is a Kamisar?", 102 MICH. L. REV. 1732 (2004)
[hereinafter LaFave, What is a Kamisar?].
2. Some skeptics out there might not believe this, so I will cite a reliable source. See
Wayne R. LaFave, Random Thoughts by a Distant Collaborator, 94 MICH . L. REV. 2431,
2435 n.11 (1996).
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who has both personally coerced a confession and had a confession
coerced out of him.3
As Kamisar has himself noted,4 my own "intellectual sandbox" has
been the field of search and seizure, which has occupied much of my
attention for virtually all of my professional life. Among my endeavors
in that regard is a treatise on the subject, now in its five-volume third
edition,5 in which I have "created" (in the Frankensteinian sense) a
1,687,149-word exceptionally execrable excrescence6 upon the 54-word
Fourth Amendment. Such efforts notwithstanding, I have
understandably not had this "sandbox" to myself; there is no way I
could claim exclusive rights to an entire amendment to the
Constitution. Indeed, there were footprints in the sandbox upon my
very first visit, most prominently those of Yale Kamisar, and he has
often revisited since my arrival, all to my benefit. I have read and re
read Yale's many contributions to this area, and have profited greatly
from the insights I have gained from them. That being the case, when
the Review asked if I would do a Fourth Amendment piece for this
issue honoring Yale Kamisar, I accepted immediately.
The subject of this Article is an exceedingly important one, as is
reflected by the fact that in recent years more Fourth Amendment
battles have been fought about police activities incident to what the
courts call a "routine traffic stop"7 than in any other context. There is
a reason why this is so, and it is not that police have taken an intense
interest in such matters as burned-out taillights and unsignaled lane
changes per se. Rather, as anyone not on a trip to Mars over the past
decade or so is surely aware, the renewed interest of the police in
traffic enforcement is attributable to a federally sponsored initiative
related to the "war on drugs. "8 Both in urban areas and on the
3. Simultaneously at that. See LaFave, What is a Kamisar?, supra note 1, at 1736.
4. Jerold H. Israel & Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave: Search and Seizure Commentator
at Work and Play, 1993 U. ILL. L.REV. 187, 188 (1993).
5. 1-5 WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (3d ed. 1996) (hereinafter LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1996)].
6. To the astonishment of some. See Israel & Ka misar, supra note 4,

at

188-89.

7. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998); United States v. Lofton, 333 F.3d 874
(8th Cir. 2003); State v. Green, 826 A.2d 486, 489 (Md. 2003); Fender v. State, 74 P.3d 1220,
1225 (Wyo. 2003).
8. Albert Alschuler has written that:
The federal government has strongly encouraged state and local Jaw enforcement officers to
view the highway as a battleground in the war on drugs. It has trained patrol officers to use
traffic stops to investigate suspected drug offenses. See the Drug Enforcement
Administration's description of "Operation Pipeline," available online at http://www.usdoj.
gov/dea/programs/pipecon.htm, and see also the Department of Transportation's description
of the training courses offered by the Drug Interdiction Assistance Program of the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration, available online at http://www.fmcsa. dot.gov/ntc/
pages/set.html. The federal government also has provided financial incentives for state and
local drug interdiction. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 881(e)(l)(A) & (e)(3) (West 2002). States have
established programs like "Operation Valkyrie," a program designed to "enhance [the)
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interstates, police are on the watch for "suspicious" travelers, and
when a modicum of supposedly suspicious circumstances are observed
- or, perhaps, even on a hunch or pursuant to such arbitrary
considerations as the color of the driver's skin9 - it is only a matter of
time before some technical or trivial offense produces the necessary
excuse for a traffic stop.10 Perhaps because the offenses are often so
insignificant,11 the driver may be told at the outset that he will merely
be given a warning. But then things get ugly. As a part of the
"routine," a criminal-history and outstanding-warrants records check
is run on the driver and passengers; they are closely questioned about
their identities, the reason for their travels, their intended
destinations, and the like, and may be quizzed as to whether they have
drugs on their persons or in the vehicle. The driver may be induced to
submit to a full search of the vehicle, or a drug-sniffing dog may
appear on the scene and "do his thing."

capability [of the Illinois State Police) to detect and apprehend drug couriers . . . while
focusing on the enforcement of highway safety regulations." Operation Valkyrie: An
Officer's Guide to Drug Interdiction Techniques, quoted in Chavez v Illinois State Police, 251
F.3d 612. 62[1) (7th Cir. 2001) (first and second alterations in original).
Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 170
n.25 (some citations omitted).
9. As one distinguished black educator has wryly noted, "[t]here's a moving violation
that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While Black." Henry Louis Gates,
Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 59. There is
now a significant body of literature on the subject of racial profiling, most of which occurs in
the context of traffic stops. See 1 W AYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 1.4 n.77.36
(Supp. 2004) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (Supp.)].
10. As Markus Dubber writes:
Every day, millions of cars are stopped for one of the myriad of regulations governing our
use of public streets. As soon as you get into your car, even before you tum the ignition key,
you have subjected yourself to intense police scrutiny. So dense is the modern web of motor
vehicle regulations that every motorist is likely to get caught in it every time he drives to the
grocery store.
Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law,
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 874 (2001).
1 1 . Indeed, sometimes bordering on the nonexistent. See United States v. Akram, 165
F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1999) (characterizing case as "an example of the very questionable
police conduct that is permitted by Whren," see infra text accompanying note 48); id. at 457
(Guy, J., dissenting) (explaining police conduct was questionable because police ordinarily
"do not stop vehicles on interstate highways for speeding when they are only exceeding the
speed limit by two miles per hour"); United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1 996)
(holding that when Utah deputy patrolling Interstate 70 saw an automobile driven by a black
man straddle the center line for about one second before proceeding to the other lane of
traffic, officer had sufficient suspicion the operator was driving while impaired to support
stop); United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 1993), (discussed in the text
accompanying note 12 infra); State v. Waters, 780 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (La. 2001) (finding
driver's one-time "contact" with fog line without crossing it sufficient basis for stop for
improper lane use; dismissing defendant's claim "that this 'almost violation' marks the de
minimis point at which Whren's objective approach no longer provides a workable rule for
determining the reasonableness of vehicular stops").
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My favorite illustration of this tactic is United States v. Roberson.12
A Texas state trooper on patrol at night passed a van and noted it had
out-of-state plates and four black occupants, so he pulled off onto the
shoulder after cresting a hill, turned his lights off, and then observed
the van change lanes to provide more distance between it and the
vehicle parked on the shoulder. The lane change was unaccompanied
by a signal, which hardly seems remarkable in view of the fact that the
van was "the only moving vehicle on that stretch of road," but the
trooper "obviously regarded this as a serious traffic offense," for he
pulled the van over.13 He then questioned the van's occupants on
unrelated matters and finally exacted consent to search the vehicle,
which resulted in the discovery of drugs. Despite the court's familiarity
with this trooper's "propensity for patroling the fourth amendment's
outer frontier" and his "remarkable record" of turning traffic stops
into drug arrests on 250 prior occasions, the defendants in Roberson
were deemed to be without any basis to challenge the stop because,
after all, the trooper had "observed a traffic infraction before stopping
the vehicle"!14
Cases of this genre raise a number of important issues concerning
the Fourth Amendment legalities of the "routine traffic stop" from
start to finish. As to the start, there are various questions concerning
the limitations upon when such a stop may be initiated. As to the
finish, there are questions concerning what is necessary to constitute a
termination of custody and what official actions thereafter will or will
not constitute a new seizure. And then there is the in-between, that
critical period between start and finish; as to it, there is another set of
questions concerning how long the seizure may continue and what
investigative techniques and tactics are permissible during that
interval.
I.

THE START: LAWFULNESS OF THE TRAFFIC STOP

A.

Quantum of Evidence

The primary (indeed, virtually exclusive) inquiry appropriate to
determining the lawfulness of a traffic stop is whether there was a pre
existing sufficient quantum of evidence to justify the stop. In the run
of-the-mill case, this presents no significant problem, for most traffic
stops are made based upon the direct observations of unambiguous
conduct or circumstances by the stopping officer. That is, in most of
the cases the stopping will have been made on full probable cause.

12. 6 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 1993).
13. Id. at 1089.
14. Id. at 1092.
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Because the Supreme Court has recently told us, in the roundly
criticized15 case of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 16 that probable cause
alone suffices to justify a custodial arrest for the slightest traffic
offense, it is apparent that the same is true for the lesser intrusion of a
traffic stop.17
Probable cause, of course, is the well-established constitutional
standard for arrest where more serious criminal conduct has
apparently occurred, and in such a context has worked rather well as a
basis for determining which suspected offenders should and should not
be apprehended. With respect to traffic offenses, however, even
though "the establishment of probable cause based on the word of the
officer is practically a given,"18 there is good reason to be less
sanguine. At least since the police have co-opted our traffic codes as a
weapon to be used in the "war on drugs," police make stops for the
most insignificant conduct lying at (or perhaps just beyond) the outer
boundaries of the defined prohibited conduct, and courts uphold those
tactics by broad interpretation of the definitions of the traffic offenses
involved.19 Although the matter is seldom put this way, it is as if the
courts were saying that at the probable-cause level (as compared to
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt level), a reasonable but perhaps
erroneous interpretation of the substantive statute relied upon by the
officer is good enough. But that simply is not the case, for it is well
established Fourth Amendment doctrine that the sufficiency of the
claimed probable cause must be determined by considering the
conduct and circumstances deemed relevant within the context of the
15. I have taken a dim view of Atwater, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (Supp.),
supra note 9, § 5.1 (citing text at notes 314.3 ff.), as has Ross Perot, see Wayne R. LaFave,
The Fourth Amendment as a "Big Time" TV Fad, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 265, 267-71 (2001), and
the Court's reasoning in that case has been effectively demolished by such distinguished
commentators as Thomas Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A
Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v.
Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002), and Richard Frase, What Were They
Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (2002).
16. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
17. If the offense is only a parking violation, however, then it may be that probable
cause alone will not suffice, or at least a few courts have so held. See United States v.
Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 594 (6th Cir. 2003) (parking violation was a violation of the traffic
laws and thus justified a stop on probable cause, but "[b]ecause a parking violation
necessarily takes place only when a vehicle is stopped or standing, the time in which a
moving vehicle can reasonably be stopped for a parking violation is relatively limited");
State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 1997) ("A police officer who has probable
cause to believe that a person has committed a parking violation can stop the person only if
the stop is necessary to enforce the violation, for example, if a person is attempting to drive
off with an illegally parked car before the officer can issue the ticket.").
18. Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops - The
Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 ,
4 (2001) [hereinafter Whorf, Consent Searches].
19. See cases cited supra note 11.
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actual meaning of the applicable substantive provision, rather than the
officer's claimed interpretation of that statute.20
But if, as is clear, probable cause is a permissible basis for a traffic
stop, is it the only basis, or will some lesser standard also suffice, such
as the reasonable-suspicion standard approved in Terry v. Ohio21 for
certain investigative stops? Most courts have assumed the latter, i.e.,
that traffic stops as a class are permissible without probable cause if
there exists reasonable suspicion, that is, merely equivocal evidence.
Such an assumption is to be found in the federal-court decisions of the
various circuits,22 as well as in the decisions of most states.23 In most of
these cases the matter has not even been put into issue by the
defendant (often because it appears the stop would pass muster even
under the probable-cause test), but on the rare occasions when the
defendant has made a contrary claim it is often rather summarily
dismissed.24 A few state decisions are to be found not permitting
stopping for all traffic violations; some are grounded in a state
statutory provision so limiting the police authority to make stops,25 but
on other occasions courts, whether or not mentioning the Fourth
Amendment, have engaged in analyses one would expect to be
employed in determining the issue under the Fourth Amendment.26
20. See, e.g. , United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Freeman, 209 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1 198
(10th Cir. 1999). The same rule applies even if a "reasonable-suspicion" standard is
applicable. See infra note 28.
On the other hand, if the officer's interpretation of the statute is unduly broad but the
perceived conduct or circumstances fit within the statute as properly construed, then
probable cause is not defeated. See United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th
Cir. 2000).
21. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
22. E.g., United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003); Haynie v.
County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336
F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2003).
23. E.g., State v. Bohannon, 74 P.3d 980 (Haw. 2003); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 1 15
(Kan. 2003); State v. Chavez, 668 N.W.2d 89 (S.D. 2003).
24. E.g., United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1 101 (9th Cir. 2000).
25. E.g., State v. Painter, 676 P.2d 309, 313 (Or. 1984) ("Traffic infractions are not
among the category of offenses to which the stop and frisk statute applies.").
26. See, e.g. , Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 700 (Alaska 1978) (holding police suspicion
was sufficient here only because suspicion was of driving under the influence, since court
previously required that for a Terry stop the officer must have "a reasonable suspicion that
imminent public danger exists, or serious harm to persons or property has recently
occurred"); State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 1997) (stating that, because in
Terry "the Supreme Court necessarily has limited such seizures to those situations where the
suspected violation is serious," "we hold that a police officer who merely has reasonable
suspicion that a parking violation has occurred cannot seize an individual for the purpose of
investigation"); Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2001) (following a prior
ruling that took an interest-balancing approach, court held that notwithstanding statute
purporting to authorize stops upon " ' "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a
violation" ' " of the vehicle code, the officer must have facts "which would provide probable
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Illustrative of the few cases expressly rejecting a defendant's claim
that probable cause is required for some traffic violations is United
States v. Callarman, where the district court had upheld the stop on
the ground that the officer either had probable cause or reasonable
suspicion (without specifying which) of violation of the statute making
it a traffic infraction to drive with windshield damage so severe that it
"substantially obstructs the driver's clear view" of the road, where the
officer saw a twelve-inch crack just above where the windshield met
the hood.27 The court of appeals affirmed, but failed to address the
defendant's contention that under Terry a seizure on reasonable
suspicion requires a higher public interest than the enforcement of
minor traffic offenses. As one commentator has cogently elaborated:
The Callarman court's analysis did not consider the seriousness of the
suspected offense in determining whether the reasonable suspicion
standard was applicable, thus rendering its analysis contrary to Supreme
Court precedent. Two aspects of the Callarman opinion suggest this lack
of consideration. First, the court heavily relied on cases in which the
suspected offenses were distinguishable from that in Callarman. In both
Botero-Ospina and Ozbirn the police officers suspected that the
defendants were driving drunk; in Brignoni-Ponce the Court held that
stopping an automobile would be constitutional where the police officer
has reasonable suspicion that the car is transporting illegal aliens. The
hazard created by a windshield crack infraction does not appear to be
nearly as grave as drunk driving, and transporting illegal aliens is an
offense different in both degree and kind from the one in Callarman.
That the Tenth Circuit did not even attempt to explain away these
distinctions indicates that the court either overlooked them or viewed
them as irrelevant. The precedential value of the cited cases for the
court's purposes thus appears to have rested on the one factual similarity
between them and Callarman: they all involved stops of vehicles. Second,
the court's failure to engage directly Callarman's serious offense
argument suggests that the court did not accept it. Had the court
accepted the argument, it could have at least reasoned - perhaps
somewhat tenuously - that the windshield crack infraction created a
substantial risk of immediate danger to the public and warranted a
departure from the probable cause requirement. That the court did not
go this route suggests that it justified its application of the reasonable
suspicion standard solely on the basis of the less intrusive nature of a
temporary seizure. The court's reasoning would seem to allow a

cause to believe" there was such a violation (quoting Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 668 A.2d
1 1 13, 1 116-17 (quoting 75 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 6308(b) (1996)))). For more on the Alaska and
Pennsylvania positions, respectively, see David A. Greene, Investigative Stops in Alaska: Can
Coleman Survive a Multifactored Balance?, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 381 (1990), and Joseph E.
Vogrin, D UI Traffic Stops in Pennsylvania, 3 No. 5 LAW. J., at 6 (2003).

27. 273 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN .§ 8-1741(b) (1991)).
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temporary seizure upon reasonable suspicion of, for example, curfew
violation or littering.28

The issue that Callarman and other cases of that genre fail to meet
head-on - whether under Terry a stop is permissible upon less than
probable cause merely because of the lesser intrusion or because of
both a lesser intrusion and a strong government-enforcement interest
- has never been specifically decided by the Supreme Court, although
language in some of the Court's decisions might lead one to conclude
otherwise. On the one hand, there is the statement in Whren v. United
States that, " [a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile
is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred,"29 which has been echoed in subsequent
decisions.30 But it may quite properly be said of these decisions that
while they "indicate that probable cause is a sufficient ground for a
stop, none of them indicates that it is necessary for a stop. "31 On the
other hand, there is the statement in Berkemer v. McCarty,32 later
relied upon in Knowles v. lowa,33 that a routine traffic stop "is more
analogous to a so-called ' Terry stop' . . . than to a formal arrest."34 But
in neither case was the quantum of evidence needed for a traffic stop
at issue, and the context of the above-quoted language from Berkemer
makes it apparent that the Court was only saying that a traffic stop,
like a Terry stop, is temporary and brief in nature.
Somewhat more on point than any of those cases is Delaware v.
Prouse, for the actual holding of the case is:
except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile
is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise
subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and

28. Recent Cases, Tenth Circuit Applies Reasonable Suspicion Standard to Stops for
Minor Traffic Infractions: United States v. Callarman, 116 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700-01 (2002)
(citations omitted).
Similar criticisms could be made of the Ninth Circuit's earlier holding to the same effect
in United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1 101 (9th Cir. 2000). The defendant, however,
prevailed in Lopez-Soto because the police did not have a reasonable suspicion. Applying
the same rule that obtains when the test is probable cause, see cases cited supra note 20, the
court concluded that the officer's suspicion based on the absence of a vehicle-registration
sticker visible from the rear could not constitute reasonable suspicion because it reflected a
mistake of law by the officer, i.e., failure to understand that the applicable law called for the
sticker to be affixed to the windshield.
29. 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
30. E.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 770 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000).
31. United States v. Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001).
32. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
33. 525 U.S. 1 13, 1 1 7 ( 1998).
34. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439.
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detaining the driver i n order to check his driver's license and the
registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.35

But it is to be doubted whether even Prouse settles the matter here
at issue, for (i) the case involved traffic stops made purely at random,
so that the emphasis was upon the impropriety of such stops rather
than the relative merits of the probable-cause and reasonable
suspicion tests in traffic-law enforcement; (ii) the Court actually
accepted the notion that under a balancing approach (such as was used
in Terry) "the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests,"36 so that the nature of the offense would be
relevant; and (iii) the particular purpose of the stopping addressed in
Prouse may involve an interest much stronger than is true of traffic
enforcement generally, i.e., "the danger to life and property posed by"
an unlicensed driver not "physically qualified to operate a motor
vehicle. "37
If the Supreme Court were to address the issue here under
discussion, it might well be that the Court would conclude that Terry
stops upon less than probable cause cannot be made with respect to all
offenses, so that a goodly number of traffic offenses would not be
encompassed within the Terry reasonable-suspicion standard. Such a
holding certainly would be faithful to the Terry decision, for there the
Court emphasized the nature of the crime there suspected, stating it
"would have been poor police work indeed" for the officer "to have
failed to investigate" behavior suggesting the defendant was casing a
store in preparation for an armed robbery.38 Later, the Court
characterized the Terry rationale as "warrant[ing] temporary
detention for questioning on less than probable cause where the public
interest involved is the suppression of . . . serious crime,"39 and has said
that under Terry, seizures made "on less than probable cause" draw
their justification from both the "limited intrusions on the personal
security of those detained" and the "substantial law enforcement
35. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
36. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
37. Id. at 658 (citations omitted); see also cases cited supra note 26. In Smith
court held that where

v.

State the

there are grounds to believe that the license of a driver has been suspended, and there is no
information to rule out the possibility that the suspension was directly related to the driver's
actual inability to drive safely, there is, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion to believe that
imminent public danger exists.
756 P.2d 913, 916 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
38. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968).
39. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1983) (plurality opinion).
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interests" being served. 40 As several of the Court's other Fourth
Amendment decisions illustrate, the seriousness of the offense thought
to be involved bears directly upon the substantiality of the law
enforcement interest41; as one member of the Court put it, the
Supreme Court has "never suggested that all law enforcement
objectives . . . outweigh the individual interests infringed upon" so as
to support a stop on reasonable suspicion. 42
An express prohibition upon Terry stops on reasonable suspicion
when the suspected offense does not involve "danger of forcible injury
to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property," 43 so that
probable cause would be required for most traffic stops,44 would be
one significant step toward enhancing the Fourth Amendment rights
of suspected traffic violators - especially in light of the now well
established police practice of using traffic stops to seek out drugs. The
point is simply this: any extraordinary grant of police authority ought
to be circumscribed in such a way as to "remove the temptation for the
police to go on fishing expeditions for contraband. " 45
B.

Protection Against Arbitrariness and Pretext

When it comes to such common criminal offenses as burglary,
theft, and assault, the quantum-of-evidence requirement for making a
seizure itself serves as a reasonably effective means of ensuring that
only those who should be apprehended are seized. But this is not the
case when it comes to traffic violations, considering (i) that stops
purportedly for such violations are often made for purposes of drug
interdiction; (ii) that this can result in stops for extremely minor and

40. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698-99 (1981).
41. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (explaining that for the use of force to
be consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an important consideration is "the severity of the
crime at issue"); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1985) (noting that factors in
the balancing test when Terry applied to "stops to investigate past crimes . . . may be
somewhat different," such that the Court limits its approval to such stops for "felonies or
crimes involving a threat to public safety"); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (an
important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists for making
a warrantless arrest within premises is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the
arrest is being made).
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), is not to the contrary, although the
Court there refused to create an exception to the custodial-arrest power for minor traffic
offenses, for the Court reasoned that because such arrests may be made only upon probable
cause there would be no necessity for any balancing of interests.
42. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 n.1 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
43. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 1 10.2(l)(a)(i) (1975).
44. Except, e.g., driving under the influence. See Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 700
(Alaska 1978).

45. Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 65 (1968).
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technical violations; and (iii) that, in any event, "[v]ery few drivers can
traverse any appreciable distance without violating some traffic
regulation."46 This means that virtually anyone (even a Supreme Court
Justice47) can readily be stopped, suggesting a need for some
additional limitation upon the authority to stop that might help
prevent pretextual or arbitrary seizures. But the Supreme Court
slammed the door on such an avenue of reform in Whren, where, upon
the petitioner's claim of a pretextual stop (resulting in a plain view of
drugs) by plainclothes vice-squad officers patrolling a "high drug area"
in an unmarked car, the Court answered in the negative the question
whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have
probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been
motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.48

Much of the Court's analysis in Whren is expended in attempting
to show that the Court's prior decisions do not lend support to a
pretext-type argument in the instant case. For example, the Court
begins by attempting to distinguish away statements in Florida v.
Wells,49 Colorado v. Bertine,50 and New York v. Burger51 seemingly
recognizing that pretextual activity sometimes violates the Fourth
Amendment. In these cases, the Whren Court now says,
we were addressing the validity of a search conducted in the absence of
probable cause. Our quoted statements simply explain that the
exemption from the need for probable cause (and warrant), which is
accorded to searches made for the purpose of inventory or administrative
regulation, is not accorded to searches that are not made for those
purposes.52

But that hardly explains why it is essential that the purported purpose
be the real purpose only in the case of inventories and administrative
searches, given that well-established Fourth Amendment doctrine
requires a "substitute," if you will, for traditional probable cause in

46. B. JAMES GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES 65 (1969).
47. Rehnquist ls Given Ticket for Speeding, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1986,§ 1, at 10.
48. 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
49. 495 U.S. 1 (1990). In Wells, the Court states that "an inventory search must not be a
ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." Id. at 4.
50. 479 U.S. 367 (1987). In Bertine, the Court thought it significant that there had been
"no showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith
or for the sole purpose of investigation." Id. at 372.
51. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). In Burger, the Court noted that the warrantless administrative
inspection upheld did not appear to be "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of .. . violation
of ... penal laws." Id. at 717 n.27.
52 Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-12.
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both of those situations. Significantly, this substitute is stated in terms
of regularity and not motive in both instances; vehicle inventories
require "standardized procedures,"53 while administrative searches of
buildings must conform to "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards. "54
Indeed, the Court's basis for distinguishing Wells, Bertine, and
Burger virtually overlooks the very core of the petitioner's argument
in Whren, earlier stated quite accurately by the Court as being that
"in the unique context of civil traffic regulations" probable cause is not
enough. Since . . . the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely
regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly
impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be able to catch any
given motorist in a technical violation. This creates the temptation to use
traffic stops as a means of investigating other law violations, as to which
no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists. ... To avoid this
danger . .. the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be, not
the normal one . .. of whether probable cause existed to justify the stop;
but rather, whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made
the stop for the reason given. 5 5

The fundamental point in that argument, of course, is that probable
cause as to a minor traffic violation can be so easily come by that its
existence provides no general assurance against arbitrary police
action. Because that is so, the situation addressed by the petitioners in
Whren is more like that in Wells, Bertine, and Burger than it is like
seizures and searches on probable cause for more substantial criminal
conduct. Indeed, it is likely true that the probable-cause requirement
in the context of minor traffic offenses provides considerably less
protection against arbitrariness than do the "standardized procedures"
and "reasonable legislative or administrative standards" requirements
for inventories and administrative inspections, respectively.
The Court in Whren then goes on to say that it has "repeatedly
held and asserted the contrary" of the petitioners' "position," said to
be that "an officer's motive invalidates objectively j ustifiable
behavior."56 But that characterization is false, for the petitioners'
position is grounded in the officer's deviation from usual practice;
improper motivation unaccompanied by such deviation is not asserted
to be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Once that is
understood, it is apparent that the four cases the Whren Court relies
upon to show that "we have repeatedly held and asserted the
contrary" are readily distinguishable. In United States v. Villamonte-

53. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 377.
54. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
55. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
56. Id. at 812.
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Marquez,57 where, the Court says in Whren, "[w]e flatly dismissed the
idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their
legal justification,"58 the facts did not present the kind of issue raised
by the Whren petitioners: the point of the Court's discussion in
Villamonte-Marquez was that the Coast Guard's power to stop vessels
without any suspicion to check the manifest and other documents
certainly may be used against a vessel even more likely to have
insufficient documents because it is suspected of involvement in
smuggling. In the second case, United States v. Robinson,59 where, as
the Court put it in Whren, "we held that a traffic-violation arrest (of
the sort here) would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was 'a
mere pretext for a narcotics search,' " 60 that in fact was not the holding
of the Court but only a paraphrasing of the respondent's argument in
the lower court. Rather, what Robinson says on this subject is that
respondent has no complaint because the custodial arrest "was not a
departure from established police department practice,"61 which is in
no sense inconsistent with the petitioners' claim in Whren that they
should prevail because the arrest was such a departure. The third case
cited in Whren as "contrary" to the petitioner's argument is the
companion case to Robinson, Gustafson v. Florida.62 However, the
truth of the matter is that the majority opinion in Gustafson never
discusses the significance of either ulterior motive or departure from
usual practice, which is hardly surprising in light of the fact (as noted
by Justice Stewart in his concurrence) that "the petitioner ha[d] fully
conceded the constitutional validity of his custodial arrest."63 The
fourth case, of course, is Scott v. United States,64 where, the Court
reminds us in Whren, it was said that " [s)ubjective intent alone . . .
does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional."65
But that language too is hardly contrary to the stance of the Whren
petitioners, who grounded their claim not in bad thoughts but in
disparate treatment. And the quoted language in Scott would appear

57. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
58. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812.
59. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
60. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13.
61. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.1. The Whren Court later acknowledged that this is what
the Court said earlier in Robinson. It is interesting to note that while the Court's
misstatement about what Robinson has to say on the subject of pretext is called a holding,
what the Court actually said there is characterized as "not even a dictum that purports to
provide an answer, but merely one that leaves the question open." Whren, 517 U.S. at 816.
62. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
63. Id. at 267 (Stewart, J., concurring).
64. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
65. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136.
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not even to settle the issue whether bad motive is at all relevant in a
pretext context, for Scott itself was not a pretext case.66
By this reckless use of its own precedents, the Court in Whren
makes it appear that the issue raised by the petitioners was already
settled, while in fact it was very much an open question. The fact that
the Court created this false appearance perhaps explains why the
Court in Whren had so little to say about the merits of the petitioners'
claim. And what is said is less than satisfying. For example, while the
petitioners reasoned that their test was an "objective" one and thus
did not conflict with the Scott rule, the Whren Court answers that the
test "is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considerations"
because it asks "whether (based on general police practices) it is
plausible to believe that the officer had the proper state of mind."67
But surely this is not the case, as the petitioners' test would only
identify arbitrariness in the disparate-treatment sense, which can occur
with or without bad thoughts, just as bad thoughts might (but do not
inevitably) produce disparity.
The Court in Whren next asserts that the petitioners' reliance upon
material deviation from usual police practices instead of actual police
motivation "might make sense" if Scott et al. "were based only upon
the evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective intent. "68 But, says
the Court, those cases "were not based only upon that, or indeed even
principally upon that," for their "principal basis" is "simply that the
Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain
actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent."69 In other words, the reason we ordinarily bar inquiry into
subjective intent is not because it is too difficult to ascertain,70 but
rather because it is simply irrelevant. But why is it irrelevant? All the
Court has to offer on that point is the following quotation from
Robinson: "Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the
authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not

66. The question in Scott was whether the agents had made reasonable efforts at
minimizing the calls they intercepted, but significantly the agents did not exceed the
statutory minimization constraints even though they apparently intended to do so. Scott,
therefore, "merely held that improper intent that is not acted upon does not render
unconstitutional an otherwise constitutional search." John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 83-84 (1982).
67. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. And thus Whren applies even in those cases where no such difficulty exists because
the officers "frankly stated" that they did not rely on the traffic violation now used as a
justification for the stop. See United States v. Harrell, 268 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721 (2d Cir. 1998).
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indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself
suspect that [the arrestee] was armed."71
But this is mixing apples and oranges. The context of the just
quoted excerpt from Robinson makes it apparent that the question
there was not whether subjective intent should be taken into account,
but rather whether the right to search incident to arrest depends upon
"the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. "72 The
Court in Robinson answered that in the negative, and thus opted for
the pragmatic, bright-line rule that "a lawful custodial arrest" carries
with it a right to make "a full search of the person."73 That is a
different matter entirely! The fact that "a lawful custodial arrest"
permits such a full search without a case-by-case showing of need or
the officer's thoughts about that need says nothing about whether the
taking of custody should itself be deemed lawful even when it is
pretextual (a matter not even at issue in Robinson). To put it another
way, the search in Robinson is like the plain view in Whren: neither
requires any justification apart from the custodial arrest (in Robinson)
or detention (in Whren) that made them possible. But that fact hardly
dictates the result as to the quite different question of whether the
seizure in each case is itself conclusively reasonable if grounded in
probable cause.
The Court in Whren next asserts that even if the concern
underlying the Scott rule "had been only an evidentiary one," it would
exist in spades under the approach of the petitioners, for "it seems to
us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer
than to plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement in
order to determine whether a 'reasonable officer' would have been
moved to act upon the traffic violation."74 But, while it cannot be
denied that the Whren petitioners' approach does present some
difficulties of this kind, the Court makes the situation appear much
worse than it actually is. The Court acknowledges that "police
manuals and standard procedures may sometimes provide objective
assistance,"75 but then appears to dismiss these manuals and
procedures because they "vary from place to place and from time to
time."76 Specifically, the Court declares that it could not "accept that
71. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)).
72. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
73. Id.
74. Whren, 517 U.S. at 814-15.
75. Id. I have elsewhere argued that greater reliance upon police regulations is desirable
in Fourth Amendment adjudication. See Wayne R. Lafave, Controlling Discretion by
Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in
Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442 (1990).
76. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815.
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the search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are so
variable" that the "basis of invalidation [in one jurisdiction] would not
apply in jurisdictions that had a different practice."77 But because
pretext claims are grounded in a concern about arbitrariness - the
lack of substantial consistency within a particular law-enforcement
agency - it would seem that it is this consistency, rather than
complete consistency from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, which counts
the most. Nor can it be said that the Fourth Amendment means
exactly the same thing in all jurisdictions; for example, an inventory
search or administrative search which violates the Fourth Amendment
because it does not conform to "standard procedures" or existing
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards" in one jurisdiction
may readily pass muster in another jurisdiction precisely because those
procedures or standards exist or are different there.
In the concluding portion of its opinion in Whren, the Court takes
on the petitioners' argument ''that the balancing inherent in any
Fourth Amendment inquiry requires us to weigh the governmental
and individual interests implicated in a traffic stop such as we have
here. "78 The Court responds that while it is "true that in principle
every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a 'reasonableness'
determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors," it is
nonetheless the case that with "rare exceptions . . . the result of that
balancing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon
probable cause."79 As for those exceptions, the Court elaborated:
Where probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have
found it necessary actually to perform the "balancing" analysis involved
searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually
harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical interests - such as,
for example, seizure by means of deadly force,80 unannounced entry into
a home,81 entry into a home without a warrant,82 or physical penetration
of the body.83 The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not
remotely qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is governed by the
usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been broken
"outbalances" private interest in avoiding police contact.84

Such characterization substantially misrepresents the essence of
the problem presented to the Court in Whren. True, making an arrest
77. Id.
78. Id. at 816.
79. Id. at 817.
80. Id. at 818 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
81. Id. (citing Wilson
82. Id. (citing Welsh

v.

v.

83. Id. (citing Winston
84. Id.

Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)).
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)).

v.

Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)).
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while out of uniform is not an "extreme practice" per se, and thus that
fact standing alone hardly can make a traffic stop unreasonable. B ut
that is not what was at issue. The fact the traffic stop was by
plainclothes officers in an unmarked car is relevant because a police
department regulation prohibited such stops except in circumstances
apparently not present in Whren,85 so that the petitioners' real
complaint was about the arbitrariness in subjecting them to a traffic
stop contrary to general practice. And surely arbitrary intrusions upon
liberty are just as "extreme" as those actions mentioned by the Court
in Whren; indeed, it would seem ludicrous to contend otherwise given
the Court's frequent assertions that the "core,"86 "basic purpose,"87
and "central concem"88 of the Fourth Amendment has to do with
protecting liberty and privacy against arbitrary governmental
interference.
The totality of the Court's analysis in Whren is, to put it mildly,
quite disappointing. By misstating its own precedents and
mischaracterizing the petitioners' central claim, the Court managed to
trivialize what in fact is an exceedingly important issue regarding a
pervasive law-enforcement practice. Certainly one would have
expected more from an opinion which drew neither a dissent nor a
cautionary concurrence from any member of the Court. I am not
suggesting that the issue raised by petitioners is an easy one, but it
certainly deserved a much more honest and forthright treatment than
it received.
Two final comments about Whren are in order. The first, related to
the earlier discussion of the common assumption that stops for all
traffic violations need only be based on reasonable suspicion, involves
the intriguing question whether Whren would have come out
differently if the traffic stop in that case had merely been on
reasonable suspicion, so that Terry v. Ohio89 provides would have
provided the sole j ustification for the stop. Taking literally the
distinction drawn in Whren
police action "based upon probable
cause" versus such action "without the probable cause that is its
traditional justification"90 - the case would then appear to fall on the
other side of the line drawn by the Court. The analysis in Terry also
-

85. Metropolitan Police Dep't - Washington, D.C., General Order 303, pt. 1,
Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(a)(4) (Apr. 30, 1992), permits plainclothes officers in
unmarked vehicles to enforce traffic laws "only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to
pose an immediate threat to the safety of others."
86. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
87. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.523, 528 (1967).
88. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.891, 895 (1975).
89. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
90. Whren, 517 U.S. at 817 (emphasis omitted).
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lends support to this view, for while the Court in Whren says the stop
was on probable cause and thus there is no occasion for balancing,
Terry asserts that stops when probable cause is lacking are to be
"tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures"91 and that consequently a
balancing of interests is necessary. It is nonetheless to be doubted that
the boundaries of the Whren decision will ultimately be drawn short of
Terry stops and other Fourth Amendment activities permitted on
individualized suspicion. Rather, the Court can be counted upon to
say that arbitrariness inquiries are likewise foreclosed in those
instances as well because (as intimated at one point in Whren) the
existence of reasonable suspicion likewise "ensure[s] that police
discretion is sufficiently constrained."92 The Court quietly asserted the
contrary in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,93 but seems to have moved at
least partly in the other direction in United States v. Knights.94
Lastly, there is the matter of an equal-protection challenge in this
context. The petitioners in Whren were black, and they put before the
Court the fact that selective traffic enforcement of the type described
above not infrequently is influenced by the race of the vehicle's
occupants. To this, the Court responded that it "agree[d] with
petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the
law based on considerations such as race," though "the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."95 But it is
difficult to believe that an equal-protection challenge would be
effective in this context,96 especially if existing law regarding selective91. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
92. Whren, 517 U.S. at 817-18.
93. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). The Court appeared to say that Whren does not extend to stops
on reasonable suspicion, asserting:
Terry v. Ohio . . . upon which the dissent relies . . . is not to the contrary. Terry certainly
supports a more finely tuned approach to the Fourth Amendment when police act without
the traditional justification that either a warrant (in the case of a search) or probable cause
(in the case of arrest) provides; but at least in the absence of "extraordinary" circumstances,
Whren v. United States . . . there is no comparable cause for finicking when police act with
such justification.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347 n.16.

94. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). The Court in Knights held that a probation search could be
justified not merely on a "special needs" analysis, as in the past, but also through a balancing
process "under our general Fourth Amendment approach." Id. at 1 18. The Court thus
upheld a search of a probationer's premises grounded in reasonable suspicion, though made
by a police officer as part of a regular criminal investigation, adding that because "our
holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis that considers all the circumstances of
a search," id. at 122, the motivation of the officer was, per Whren, not relevant. Justice
Souter, concurring, would have "reserve[d] the question whether Whren's holding . . . should
extend to searches based only upon reasonable suspicion." Id. at 123 (Souter, J., concurring).
95. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
96. A s one commentator has put it:
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prosecution challenges is followed here.97 Police agencies take
considerable pains to keep secret all training materials, directives, and
instructions that might reflect the basis upon which selective traffic
stops for drug-enforcement purposes are undertaken.98 And under the
requirements announced by the Supreme Court just weeks before
Whren was decided, the defendant's chances of even obtaining
discovery are slight, for it is necessary that he first "produce some
evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have
been prosecuted, but were not."99 Moreover, "[o]nly in rare cases will
a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact conclusively demonstrate
a constitutional violation."100 Even if a defendant were to clear those
hurdles, it is still less than certain that meaningful relief would be
forthcoming, for absent recognition of an equal protection
exclusionary rule,101 the defendant's only relief is likely to be dismissal
of the traffic charge.

In theory there is no problem with relying on the Equal Protection Clause to protect against
racial unfairness in Jaw enforcement. The problem is that equal protection doctrine,
precisely because it attempts to address all constitutional claims of inequity, has developed
in ways that poorly equip it to address the problems of discriminatory police conduct. Equal
protection doctrine treats claims of inequitable policing the same as any other claim of
inequity; it gives no recognition to the special reasons to insist on evenhanded Jaw
enforcement, or to the distinctive concerns with arbitrariness underlying the Fourth
Amendment. As a result, challenges to discriminatory police practices will fail without proof
of conscious racial animus on the part of the police. For reasons discussed earlier, this
amounts to saying that they will almost always fail.
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 271, 326.
97. Thus it has been suggested that Whren makes necessary a different approach as to
equal protection claims, at least in this context. See Christopher Hall, Note, Challenging
Selective Enforcement of Traffic Regulations After the Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v.
United States, United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police Discretion, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1083, 1086-87 (1998); Jennifer A. Larrabee, Note, "DWB (Driving While Black)"
and Equal Protection: The Realities of an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL'Y
291, 295-96 (1997); Lisa Walter, Comment, Eradicating Racial Stereotyping from Terry Stops:
The Case for an Equal Protection Exclusionary Rule, 71 U.COLO.L. REV. 255, 289 (2000).
98. See, e.g. , People v. Perez, 631 N.E.2d 240 (Ill. App.Ct.1994).
99. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.456, 469 (1996); see also, e.g., United States v.
Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding against black defendant who claimed his
traffic stop "was motivated by a race-based drug courier profile" because he "has failed to
meet the rigorous standard for proving such a violation" imposed by A rmstrong); United
States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that black bicyclist stopped for lack of
headlamp who "showed the only people arrested for violating the statute during a certain
month were black" and that "there are no lights on 98% of all bicycles in the Des Moines
area, which is populated predominantly by white people" did not meet his Armstrong
burden, as he "presented no evidence about the number of white bicyclists who ride their
bicycles between sunset and sunrise," though police admitted they had "targeted" a high
crime area "populated primarily by minorities").
100. United States v.Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 356 (6th Cir. 1997).
101. As noted by Alschuler:
Police violations of the Equal Protection Clause warrant an effective remedy no less than
police violations of the Fourth Amendment.To say that the Supreme Court would have no
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THE IN-B ETWEEN: D IMENSIONS OF A LAWFUL TRAFFIC STOP

Given that police can easily come by a factual basis for a traffic
stop, that such stops are often motivated by drug-enforcement
purposes, and that there exists virtually no basis for questioning the
initiation of such a stop because of its pretextual or arbitrary nature, it
is apparent that the permissible dimensions of a lawful traffic stop are
matters of some importance. How long may the traffic violator be
detained, and exactly what activities of an investigative nature not
strictly related to the infraction serving as the basis of the stop are
permissible? To explore this question, it is necessary initially to
determine what standards do or should govern such cases - in
particular, to assess the extent to which limits on Terry investigative
stops are appropriate in a traffic stop context. Then a closer look can
be taken at the various investigative techniques now "routinely"
employed during a "routine traffic stop."
A.

The Applicability of the Terry Limitations

In Berkemer v. McCarty, holding that "the roadside questioning of
a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop" does not
amount to " 'custodial interrogation' " for purposes of Miranda,102 the
Court placed considerable reliance upon its judgment that "the usual
traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ' Terry stop' than to a
formal arrest."103 In lower-court cases involving instead the Fourth
Amendment question of what temporal and scope limitations apply
during a traffic stop, that characterization from Berkemer has often
been quoted with apparent approval.104 This would lead one to believe
that the limitations imposed in the Terry case itself and in its progeny
would apply with equal force to the so-called "routine traffic stop."
What are the Terry limitations? Terry itself recognized that "in
determining whether the seizure and search were 'unreasonable' our
inquiry is a dual one - whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. "105 The
first Terry prong, of course, has to do with whether the stop was made
on reasonable suspicion (or, as earlier discussed, perhaps on probable
principled basis for refusing to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, however, is not to predict that the Court would exclude it.

Alschuler, supra note 8, at 254.
102. Berkemer

v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435 (1984).

103. Id. at 439 (citation omitted).
v.

104. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 617 (8th Cir. 2001); People
Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 265 (Ill. 2003) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions).
105. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
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cause in the case of minor traffic infractions); but it is less than
immediately apparent what is encompassed within the second prong.
The Court in Terry did remind us that the matter of "scope" requires
that the Fourth Amendment activity "must be 'strictly tied to and
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible,"106 as to which it nonetheless might be asked: "Does scope
concern only the length of the detention . . . or does scope mean the
type of questioning and investigating that occurs during the
stop . . . ?"107
The answer given in Florida v. Royer is "both," for the Court there
deemed it "clear" (i) that "an investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop," and also (ii) that "the investigative methods
employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time."108
That is, as Royer goes on to conclude, the prosecution bears the
burden of establishing that the stop was "sufficiently limited in scope
and duration."109 And thus, when called upon to apply Terry directly
rather than by analogy (that is, in cases where the stop was on
reasonable suspicion of serious criminality rather than on probable
cause of a traffic offense), the courts have enforced both the temporal
and intensity limits by, for example, insisting that any consent to
search be obtained before the time has run out110 and that, even before
the time expires, any interrogation concern an offense for which there
was then reasonable suspicion.111
When one turns to the traffic-stop cases, certainly many decisions
can be found that are faithful to the Terry limits described above by
106. Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring)).
107. Amy L. Vazquez, Comment, "Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead Bodies
in Your Car? " What Questions Can a Police Officer Ask During a Traffic Stop?, 76 TuL. L.
REV. 211, 226 (2001).
108. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
109. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added); see Vazquez, supra note 107, at 226 ("By
separating scope and duration, the Court here clearly suggested that scope is something
more than the length of the detention. A reasonable inference can be made that the
'something more' should be, and is, the type of questioning and investigating."); see also
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985) (stating the question as being whether the
circumstances "justified the length and intrusiveness of the stop and detention that actually
occurred").
110. E.g. , Commonwealth v. Helm, 690 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that
where time ran out on lawful detention on reasonable suspicion of possessing stolen
property because investigation alleviated the suspicion, consent to search thereafter was a
suppressible fruit of illegal detention).
111. E.g., Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804 (Wyo. 1996) (holding that officer did not
exceed the scope of the stop by inquiring if defendant had drugs or weapons in his
possession because, although the reasonable suspicion leading to the stop concerned a
robbery, there then developed reasonable suspicion of drug possession).
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adhering strictly to the time limits appropriate for a stop serving only
traffic-enforcement purposes112 and by proscribing investigative
techniques unrelated to the traffic violation even when they are
undertaken within the applicable time limit.113 But when it comes to
traffic stops, as will be elaborated below in the discussion of specific
investigative techniques,114 the Terry limitations are honored more
often in the breach than in the observance. For one thing, the
temporal limits are loosely observed, and courts even go so far as to
state that such limits may be extended somewhat in the interest of
permitting procedures only relevant to drug-law enforcement.115 For
another, the intensity limitation is treated as if it did not exist at all, so
that nonsearch investigative procedures undertaken to uncover drugs
are deemed permissible so long as they actually or approximately
occurred within whatever temporal limits are being observed.116
Many of the appellate decisions applying only a watered-down
version of Terry say little or nothing by way of justifying such a
departure, but recently there has been some attempt to construct a
rationale in support of this deviation. There are two central points.
One, principally directed at explaining why a range of drug-law
enforcement activities (especially interrogation) are unobjectionable
so long as they do not significantly extend the time of the traffic stop,
is essentially that those activities do not actually increase the intensity
of the encounter in a significant way and thus need not be taken into
account in determining whether the police have exceeded traffic-law
stop limitations. The other, directed mainly at showing why the notion
of temporal limitations need not be seriously considered if at all, is
that the Terry limitations reflect an effort to minimize the intrusion
when a stop is grounded only upon reasonable suspicion and hence are
not applicable (at least in the same way) to stops made on probable
cause, as most traffic stops are. These contentions are developed most
extensively in the recent en bane case of United States v. Childs,117 and

1 12. E.g. , United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Gutierrez, 51
P.3d 461 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill.2002).
1 13. E.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001); People v. Caballes, 802
N.E.2d 202 (III.2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004); State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125
(Minn. 2002).
1 1 4. See infra Section 11.B.
115. E.g. , State v. DeLaRosa, 657 N.W.2d 683 (S.D. 2003); State v.Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
1 1 6. E.g. , United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274 ( 1 1th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1 993); Lecorn v. State, 832 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2002); Henderson
v.State, 551 S.E.2d 400 (Ga.Ct. App. 2002).
117. 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (en bane). Also worth noting is an earlier case along
the same lines, United States v. $404, 905. 00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999),
curiously never mentioned in Childs. Childs itself has been embraced by some other courts.
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thus it is useful to focus upon that case in undertaking an assessment
of these arguments.
The issue in Childs was whether the panel was correct in
concluding that questioning during a traffic stop must be related to the
reason for the custody , 118 to which a majority of the full court
responded with a resounding "no." In doing so, the court began with
the Supreme Court's declaration in Florida v. Bostick that "mere
police questioning does not constitute a seizure,"119 then noted that
while most of the Court's decisions to that effect "concern questions
asked of persons not under arrest," certainly it must be equally true
that "a question asked of someone already in custody causes no delay
and thus can't be a seizure."120 Warming to the task, the Childs court
thus declared:
If the police may ask (without suspicion) questions of persons who are
in no custody (e.g., walking down the street), people who are in practical
but not legal custody (e.g., passengers on busses and airplanes), and
people who are in formal custody pending trial or following conviction
(e.g., prisoners . . . a pretrial detainee), then why would the police need
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to direct questions to persons
such as Childs who are in legal custody but likely to be released soon? To
say that questions asked of free persons and questions asked of prisoners
are not "seizures" but that questions asked of suspects under arrest are
seizures would have neither the text of the Constitution behind it nor any
logical basis under it.121

If the point of Childs were only that the panel had been wrong in
characterizing the questioning itself as a seizure, I would respond with
nothing more than a hearty "Amen." But the court immediately
inflated that sensible conclusion into a much broader proposition by
stating that "the idea that the police could violate a prisoner's fourth
amendment rights by asking questions in search of information about
other offenses has no basis in the language of that amendment or the
Supreme Court's cases."122 This assertion was apparently offered in
support of the court's opening broadside:
The full court holds that, because questions are neither searches nor
seizures, police need not demonstrate justification for each inquiry.
Questions asked during detention may affect the reasonableness of that
detention (which is a seizure) to the extent that they prolong custody, but
See United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2003); Edmond
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

118. United States
(7th Cir. 2002).

v.

v.

State, 116 S.W.3d 110

Childs, 256 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2001), rev'd en bane, 277 F.3d 947

119. Childs, 277 F.3d at 950 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 951.
122 Id.
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questions that do not increase the length of detention (or that extend it
by only a brief time) do not make the custody itself unreasonable or
require suppression of evidence found as a result of the answers. 123

This is a much broader proposition - in effect, that because
interrogation is not a seizure it can have no bearing upon the
reasonableness of a seizure unless it significantly adds to its length. As
one court rejecting the Childs approach aptly put it, that conclusion is
hardly supported by the Bostick quote, for the Court in that case "did
not address the issue" of "whether, in the context of a nonconsensual
police-citizen encounter, police questioning on matters unrelated to
the purposes of the initial stop can be so intrusive" as to affect the
Fourth Amendment legality of the traffic stop.124 As to that issue, the
answer most certainly is yes, for a traffic stop that has been turned into
a drug investigation via the techniques elaborated further below
(questioning about drugs, grilling about the minute details of travel
plans, seeking consent for a full roadside exploration of the motorist's
car, or parading a drug dog around the vehicle) is a far cry from a
straightforward and unadorned traffic stop in which the officer merely
checks the motorist's license and registration and writes out the
citation or warning for the observed infraction (which thus requires no
investigation of any kind). Thus, as yet another court put it,
"[a]llowing police to pose any question to the occupants of a stopped
vehicle, even if such question is totally divorced from the purpose of
the stop, effectively does away with any balancing of the competing
interests involved."125 Such a consequence is not tolerable, at least so
long as the teaching of Delaware v. Prouse that "the nature of the
intrusion" must be weighed in judging Fourth Amendment activity
remains extant.126 Moreover, this conclusion does not depend upon
how one comes out regarding the question discussed later herein of
whether Terry itself applies to stops on probable cause, for the Court's
Royer decision makes it clear that "the Fourth Amendment constrains
the scope of all searches and seizures."127
For all these reasons, it is the concurring opinion128 in the Childs
case that better understands the dynamics of a so-called "routine

123. Id. at 949.
124. United States v.Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1229 ( 10th Cir. 2001).
125. People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ill.2003).
126. Bd. of Educ. v.Earls, 536 U.S.822, 829 (2002), so characterizing Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
127. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1230 (emphasis added) (referring to the analysis in Florida
Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 499-500 (1983)).

v.

128. Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (concurring rather than dissenting
only because of the view that there was reasonable suspicion of marijuana possession
justifying the questioning).
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traffic stop" and what this means in terms of Fourth Amendment
doctrine:
In attempting to equate questioning without detention with
questioning in the course of detention, the majority conveniently ignores
the fact that detention involves official coercion and therefore concerns
quite a different relationship of the police officer to the person
questioned. Anyone who has been pulled over for a traffic offense faces
the police officer as one currently exercising authority over the motorist
to keep him or her in place. This exercise of official coercion is the
reason the Supreme Court has limited questioning to matters within the
scope of the stop. The majority does not explain why exceeding the scope
of the stop is somehow less burdensome to the detainee's Fourth
Amendment rights than exceeding a reasonable duration for the stop. To
explore bank robberies or polygamy, as to which there is no reasonable
suspicion, with Childs would be to abuse the rationale for the stop based
on other matters and would be just as abusive as extending a ten-minute
stop to an hour.
The majority comments blithely that the detainee can refuse to
answer the questions posed by the police officer. How many times have
you refused to answer questions asked by a police officer who has pulled
your car over for a traffic offense?129

In short, Fourth Amendment limitations upon "routine traffic stops"
would be grossly inadequate if expressed solely in terms of the
permissible duration of the stop.130
The en bane opinion in Childs then turns to the duration limitation
of Terry, invoked by passenger Childs because, after the vehicle was
stopped because of a broken windshield and Childs was then seen to
be violating the seat-belt law, Childs was questioned after what he
claimed was delay in running the license and warrant checks. Noting
the oft-quoted assertion that a typical traffic arrest resembles a Terry
investigative stop more than a custodial arrest, the Childs court then
reasoned:
We grant this as a factual matter, but it does not follow that the
Constitution requires all traffic stops to be treated as if they were
unsupported by probable cause. What is "typical" often differs from the
constitutional minimum. Atwater131 makes this clear. A person arrested
for an offense punishable only by a fine typically is given a citation (a
"ticket") and released, but Atwater holds that the Constitution allows the
police to place the person in custody and take him to be booked. Thus

129. Id. at 960 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
130. Especially considering that courts have upheld traffic stops lasting a half hour or
more, see, e.g., United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996), or even approaching
a full hour, see, e.g. , United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753 (11th Cir. 1998).
131. The reference is to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), which held
that police have absolute and total discretion in deciding whether to make a custodial arrest
of a minor traffic violator in lieu of issuing a citation.

1868

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 102:1843

although traffic stops usually proceed like Terry stops, the Constitution
does not require this equation. Probable cause makes all the difference
- and as Whren v. United States132 shows, traffic stops supported by
probable cause are arrests, with all the implications that follow from
probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. . . .
Because probable cause supported this stop, neither the driver nor
Childs had a right to be released the instant the steps to check license,
registration, and outstanding warrants, and to write a ticket, had been
completed. It is therefore not necessary to determine whether the
officers' conduct added a minute or so to the minimum time in which
these steps could have been accomplished . . . . The extra time, if any, was
short - not nearly enough to make the seizure "unreasonable. "
Our point is not that, because Chiola could have taken Childs to a
police station for booking, any less time-consuming steps are proper. The
reasonableness of a seizure depends on what the police do, not on what
they might have done. The point, rather, is that cases such as Atwater and
McLaughlin133 show that the fourth amendment does not require the
release of a person arrested on probable cause at the earliest moment
that step can be accomplished. What the Constitution requires is that the
entire process remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for
detecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not tum
reasonable detention into unreasonable detention. 134

While at first reading this all seems very logical, upon closer
evaluation of this reasoning it is apparent that it is so seriously flawed
that other courts would be well advised to reject it and hold instead
that the Terry limitations apply without modification even to those
traffic stops made upon probable cause.135 The position taken in the
above-quoted excerpt from Childs is objectionable for these reasons:
(1) The court asserts at one point that the "reasonableness of a
seizure depends on what the police do, not on what they might have
done," but obviously doesn't mean it. Looking at "what the police do"
means that Childs involved only a traffic stop, for passenger Childs
was guilty of nothing more than a failure to wear a seat belt, and the
police had given no indication whatsoever that in dealing with this
insignificant traffic infraction they were intending to make a custodial
arrest or to take any step beyond that of possibly writing a citation.
{Indeed, it is to be doubted whether the officer could have made a
custodial arrest, for while Atwater tells us the Fourth Amendment

132. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
133. The reference is to County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), which
held that when an arrest is made without a warrant, a subsequent judicial determination of
probable cause will usually be timely if made within forty-eight hours of the arrest.
134. Childs, 277 F.3d at 953-54 (citations omitted).
135. See, e.g. , United States
789 N.E.2d 260 (III. 2003).

v.

Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001); People

v.

Gonzalez,
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would not be violated by such a step, the events of Childs occurred in
Illinois, where a driver's license - which apparently Childs had136 may be posted in lieu of bail for such an offense,137 in which case the
"officer should issue a warning ticket or a citation, as appropriate, and
allow the driver to leave."138) Since under the "what-the-police-do"
approach this was only a traffic stop, the court's reliance on Atwater
and McLaughlin makes absolutely no sense, for those decisions only
indicate the more substantial intrusions that could have followed
under a "might-have-done" scenario.139 Significantly, the Supreme
Court declined to take any such might-have-done approach in
Knowles v. Iowa,140 which involved a full search of Knowles's car
incident to a traffic-stop/citation situation relating to his driving at an
excessive speed. After noting that the state supreme court had upheld
the search by "reasoning that so long as the arresting officer had
probable cause to make a custodial arrest, there need not in fact have
been a custodial arrest"141 (a straightforward "might-have-done"
argument), a unanimous Supreme Court rejected that contention out
of hand. Rather, the Court focused upon the stop/citation character of
the events as they actually occurred, and then quite correctly noted
that the need for search in such a setting is not at all equivalent to that
existing when a custodial arrest is made: there is no need to search for
evidence of the speeding violation, and the "threat to officer safety
from issuing a traffic citation . . . is a good deal less than in the case of
a custodial arrest,"142 so that the bright-line search rule of United States
v. Robinson143 makes no sense in a traffic-stop context. So what search
power for his own protection does the officer need during a traffic
stop? Precisely that permitted under Terry, the Court answered, thus
providing yet another example of the wisdom of the Terry-stop/traffic-

136. The court noted that Childs had been stopped while driving the same vehicle
three days earlier and then was arrested when a records check disclosed an outstanding
warrant; there is no mention that the check revealed a lack of a driver's license. Childs, 277
F.3d at 949.
137. ILL. SUP. Cf. R. 526(e).
138. People v. Cox, 782 N .E.2d 275, 279 (111. 2002).
139. As noted in a concurring opinion in Childs: "What the majority seems to be saying
is that, because Officer Chiola could have gone on to a custodial arrest, he may instead (and
without subjecting Childs to custodial arrest) elect to inquire into crimes for which there is
neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion." Childs, 277 F.3d at 959 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring).
140. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
141. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 115-16.
142. Id. at 117.
143. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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stop analogy rejected in Childs. Childs simply cannot be squared with
the Supreme Court's Knowles decision.144
(2) The court in Childs never gave the slightest suggestion that its
watering down of the Fourth Amendment's application during
"routine traffic stops" had anything at all to do with some public
interest relating to the enforcement of states' traffic codes. While this
is understandable, in that no plausible claim could be made that
traffic-law enforcement is attended with unique difficulties
necessitating a reduction in personal security and privacy beyond that
tolerated in investigating honest-to-goodness criminal behavior, it is
thus apparent that underlying the Childs decision is nothing more than
a desire to assist the police in their efforts to use traffic stops as a
means of seeking drugs. That is, Childs constitutes a positive
encouragement to the police to engage in pretextual activity making stops whose sole legal justification is traffic regulation in order
to seek out drugs when grounds are lacking to detain for a narcotics
investigation. If the Supreme Court previously had actually endorsed
pretextual conduct by the police, then Childs might be at least
understandable, but the Court did not, as can be seen by recalling the
Court's reasoning in Whren v. United States. 145 Whren never says at any
point that such pretextual activities by the police are desirable, but
only that case-by-case litigation of the pretext issue is not permissible
when the police action was grounded in probable cause. In part, that
conclusion was based upon the fact that were the law otherwise courts
would regularly be "reduced to speculating about the hypothetical
reaction of a hypothetical constable."146 Moreover, when the Whren
Court got to the petitioner's claim that the usual probable-cause-is
sufficient rule should not obtain in the instant case because "the
'multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations' is so large
and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is guilty of
violation, permitting the police to single out almost whomever they
wish for a stop,"147 the Court responded solely on pragmatic grounds.
The difficulty, says the Court, is that no principled basis exists for
deciding in which areas of law enforcement that problem has reached
the point where "infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary
measure of the lawfulness of enforcement," or - even assuming such
specification was possible - of then deciding "which particular
provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement."148 The fact

144. See, e.g. , Ochana
note 153).

v.

Flores, 199 F. Supp. 2d 817 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (discussed infra

145. 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (discussed supra text accompanying note 48).
146. Whren, 517 U.S. at 815.
147. Id. at 818.
148. Id. at 818-19.
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that Whren came out this way is hardly supportive of Childs; indeed,
Whren actually shows rather clearly why Childs is so wrong-headed!
Since the Court concluded that detecting pretext on a case-by-case
basis was not worth the candle, this is all the more reason for ensuring
that the procedures permitted incident to traffic stops are limited to
those needed for traffic enforcement so as to diminish as much as
possible any police incentive to go the subterfuge route. As one court
put it, if the pretext issue cannot be raised under the first prong of
Terry, then surely the second prong must .be fully applied in order to
protect "the traveling public" from arbitrary police action.149
(3) With the Terry limits not applicable to traffic stops, there
would nonetheless be a need for some sort of limits on traffic stops, as
the Childs court admits, for it feels compelled to make a judgment that
the amount of delay in that case beyond that needed to deal with the
traffic infractions was "not nearly enough to make the seizure
'unreasonable.' "150 But if "a minute or so"151 is not even close to the
point of unreasonableness, what would be? Not even a clue to the
answer to that question is to be found in Childs, which is hardly
surprising. Once the rather clear Terry limit, tied to those activities
defensible in terms of responding to the traffic infraction, is
abandoned, there remains no other basis for making a judgment about
the legal parameters of a "routine traffic stop" - unless it is simply a
matter of applying the "horseshoes rule," i.e., that just being close
counts. But any court believing that Fourth Amendment adjudication
requires something a bit more principled than that is left in a sea of
uncertainty by Childs. As one judge aptly put it, abandonment of the
Terry limits "leaves courts speculating on the length of time after a

149. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1995). The pre-Whren
Botero-Ospina case clearly reflects this relationship between Whren and the present
problem: in Botero-Ospina, the court abandoned its prior rule that a traffic stop is
unconstitutionally pretextual if it would not have been made but for an ulterior purpose
(e.g., drug-law investigation). While the court, essentially anticipating the Whren position,
did so on the ground that experience had shown its earlier approach was "unworkable," the
court felt compelled to add that by such rejection of an opportunity for drivers to make
pretext claims:
we do not abandon the traveling public to "the arbitrary exercise of discretionary police
power." Our holding in this case properly focuses on the very narrow question of whether
the initial stop of the vehicle is objectively justified. We leave intact the vast body of law
which addresses the second prong of the Terry analysis - whether the police officer's
actions are reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in
the first place. Our well-developed case law clearly circumscribes the permissible scope of an
investigative detention. Therefore, if an officer's initial traffic stop, though objectively
j ustified by the officer's observation of a minor traffic violation, is motivated by a desire to
engage in an investigation of more serious criminal activity, his investigation nevertheless
will be circumscribed by Terry's scope requirement.

Id. (citations omitted).

150. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 953 (7th Cir. 2002).
151. Id.
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stop is over that an officer would be justified in detaining the motorist
anew," which is "a can of worms best left unopened."152
(4) The Childs analysis is nothing more than the beginning of a
descent down the slippery slope. True, the court protests that it is not
adopting some sort of greater-includes-the-lesser principle to the
effect that because under Atwater Childs could have been arrested and
detained a much longer time, any lesser imposition is unobjectionable.
But as a practical matter the only difference between the result in
Childs and such a greater-includes-the-lesser rule is that, on the facts
presented, it was only necessary to recognize a small departure from
j ust "a minute or so." But the mere
the duration standard of Terry
fact that the court on this particular occasion only had to take a small
bite out of the Fourth Amendment is hardly reassuring (especially in
light of the fact that the Childs decision has since been relied upon to
justify a further slide down the slope so far as to effectively nullify
Knowles 153). Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned against such
incremental intrusions, warning that because "unconstitutional
practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure," it "is the duty of courts to
be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. "154
(5) The only justification offered by the Childs court for
abandoning Terry in traffic-stop situations is the rather cynical
observation that the "potential for detecting crime" would be
-

152. State v. DeLaRosa, 657 N.W.2d 683, 691 (S.D. 2003) (Sabers, J., dissenting).
153. In Ochana v. Flores, 199 F. Supp. 2d 817 (N.D. Ill. 2002), police responding to a
honking of horns at a stoplight found a car blocking traffic with the driver slumped over the
wheel. An officer put the car into park and assisted the driver out of the vehicle. While one
officer was examining the driver's credentials at the rear of the vehicle, a second officer
searched a backpack inside the vehicle and found drugs. The driver (the plaintiff in this
section 1983 action) moved to bar any reference to the search as being incident to arrest on
the ground that he was not under arrest at the time. The court ruled that "a reasonable
person in Ochana's position would have thought he was under arrest," id. at 828, citing in
support the facts that "Ochana consented to talk to the investigating officers . . . that Ochana
did not depart the area without hindrance . . . [that] there is no evidence that the officers
informed Ochana that he was not under arrest or that he was free to leave, that the officers
physically touched Ochana other than to assist him from his car, or that the officers
displayed weapons or otherwise threatened Ochana," id. at 827. Perhaps appreciating that
just such facts would, in an exclusionary-rule context, merely create some doubt as to
·
whether there was a temporary stop or no seizure at all, the district court then went on to
declare that "Ochana was under arrest when his car was searched," id. at 828, for the officers
"had probable cause to believe that Ochana had committed the traffic offense of obstruction
of traffic," id. , which it deemed sufficient in light of Childs' declaration that "traffic stops
supported by probable cause are arrests, with all the implications that follow from probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed," id. (quoting Childs, 277 F.3d at 953).
On appeal, however, the court of appeals cited Knowles but not Childs in holding that
the search could not be deemed a valid search incident to arrest because there was
insufficient evidence of a custodial arrest. Ochana v. Flores, 347 F.3d 266, 270 (7th
Cir. 2003).
154. Boyd v. United States, 1 16 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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enhanced if those committing traffic infractions were given less
constitutional protection than those persons stopped because
suspected of burglary, robbery, and other serious criminal offenses.
But if ever there was a bad reason for manipulating constitutional
rights, this is it. Any other court contemplating a similar move would
be well advised to reflect upon the oft-quoted words of Justice
Frankfurter:
Violators should be detected, tried, convicted, and punished - but not at
the cost of needlessly bringing into question constitutional rights and
privileges. While law enforcement officers may find their duties more
arduous and crime detection more difficult as society becomes more
complicated, the constitutional safeguards of the individual were not
designed for short-cuts in the administration of criminal justice.1 5 5

Lastly, note should be taken of two other straws grasped by the
Childs majority. One is that the earlier-quoted156 statement from
Berkemer has appended to it a cautionary footnote reading: "We of
course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause
may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the
scope of a Terry stop."157 However, as the Childs concurrence158 notes,
this footnote, "besides being dictum, sheds little light on the present
problem because the footnote appears in the context of a discussion
whether Miranda warnings need to be administered to a detainee at a
traffic stop."159 Even more significant, as another court pointed out, is
the fact that courts
have not read this cautionary statement . . . to imply that the existence of
probable cause to believe that only a minor traffic violation was
committed is sufficient to sanction a substantially more intrusive stop
than would be justified under Terry, at least where the police officer is
not undertaking to make an arrest based on the traffic violation.160

Indeed, the Supreme Court itself, in Knowles v. Iowa, quoted the
language from Berkemer to which that footnote was appended but
ignored the footnote in holding, as to a traffic violator who had been
stopped on probable cause but had not in fact been subjected to
custodial arrest, that the search authority of the police did not exceed
that granted in Terry. 161

155. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
156. See supra text accompanying note 102.
157. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n.29 (1984).
158. Based upon the conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion of a drug offense.
159. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 959 (7th Cir. 2002) (Cudahy, J., concurring).
160. Mitchell v. United States, 746 A.2d 877, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
161. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 1 13, 117 (1998).
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The other straw is Ohio v. Robinette.162 The Childs majority asserts
that the Supreme Court, by deciding in Robinette that a valid consent
to search, in the context of a traffic stop, does not require prior
warnings that the violator was free to leave, "necessarily rejected the
broader contention that unrelated questions may not be asked at
all."163 Putting aside the doubts as to whether Robinette should be
relied upon for much of anything given the Court's inability to even
understand the basis of the state court's decision,164 the fact of the
matter is that the Court in that case "never addressed, let alone
approved, questions asked during a routine traffic stop that do not
concern the purpose of the stop or were not based upon reasonable
suspicion. "165
B.

Specific Investigative Techniques

The bare essentials of a "routine traffic stop" consist of causing the
vehicle to stop, explaining to the driver the reason for the stop,
verifying the credentials of the driver and the vehicle, and then issuing
a citation or a warning. But these days, manifesting the war-on-drugs
motivation so often underlying these stops, there are various
investigative activities unrelated to the infraction justifying the stop
that themselves are so common as to now be a part of the routine.
These activities, considered seriatim below, are: (1) a records check
via radio or computer regarding the criminal history of those stopped
and any outstanding arrest warrants for those individuals; (2)
interrogation of those stopped directly on the subject of drugs or
about the nature and purpose of their travels; (3) seeking (and often
obtaining) consent to conduct a full search of the stopped vehicle; and
(4) using a drug-sniffing dog to detect the presence of any drugs in the
stopped vehicle.
1.

Records Check

As one court has aptly put it, the "primary law enforcement
purposes" for making a traffic stop are: "(l) to verify that a violation
of the traffic laws has occurred or is occurring and, (2) to provide for
the issuance of an appropriate ticket or citation charging such traffic
violation or make an arrest of the driver based upon such violation. "166
This being the case, it might be thought that a close application of the

162. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
163. Childs, 277 F.3d at 954.
164. See infra text following note 333.
165. Childs, 277 F.3d at 960 (Cudahay, J., concurring).
166. United States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Terry doctrine to traffic stops would mean that the police could not
use the occasion to check, via radio or computer, various government
records concerning the status of the driver and the vehicle; rather, the
officer should merely investigate sufficiently to verify (where
necessary) that his pre-stop suppositions about the violation are
correct (sometimes they are not167) and then simply proceed with
citation or arrest. But the court responsible for the above-quoted
pronouncement followed it with this postscript: "In furtherance of
these purposes, the police officer is authorized to require the driver of
the vehicle to produce a valid driver's license and documentation
establishing the ownership of the vehicle and that required public
liability insurance coverages are in effect on such vehicle," after which
"the officer may run a computer check on the driver's license and
registration."168 This kind of checking of government records incident
to a "routine traffic stop," which usually takes a matter of minutes,169 is
well established as a part of the "routine,"170 and has consistently been
approved and upheld by both federal171 and state172 courts.
There is certainly no basis to question that conclusion, which is not
really inconsistent with rather strict application of the Terry standard
to traffic stops. For one thing, as a constitutional matter, thanks to the
Supreme Court's Atwater decision, the officer making the traffic stop
has, even in the most insignificant cases, the power to choose between
making a custodial arrest and giving a citation. Citation will be the
choice in most instances, but computer verification of the credentials
produced by the driver "is crucial to the successful operation of any
citation system."173 Moreover, whenever a stop is made of a person
who has violated the traffic laws, it is appropriate in those
circumstances to "run such computer verifications" because they are
"necessary to determine that the driver has a valid license and is

167. See, e.g., United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2001) (concerning vehicle
stopped on suspicion of an expired vehicle sticker and illegal windshield tinting where
immediately following the initial stop, the officer determined that the sticker was valid and
that the tinting was not too dark).
168. United States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2003).
169. The time is generally brief, but can vary some from case to case. See, e.g., United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 438 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting officer testified that a "check can
take anywhere from two to three to ten to fifteen minutes").
170. People v. Grove, 792 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ill. 2003) (holding that "an officer may
properly run a computer check on a motorist's license as a routine part of a traffic stop"
even when, as here, it was already determined that the vehicle registration was valid).
171. E.g. , United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2001).
172. E.g., State v. Lee, 658 N.W.2d 669 (Neb. 2003); Fender v. State, 74 P.3d 1220 (Wyo.
2003).
173. Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth
Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 221, 268 (1989).
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entitled to operate the vehicle."174 As the Supreme Court concluded in
Delaware v. Prouse, "the States have a vital interest in ensuring that
only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles,
that these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing,
registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed,"
so that police, "acting upon observed violations"175 of the traffic
laws,176 may "stop[] an automobile and detain[] the driver in order to
check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile. "177
However, the checking of government records via radio or
computer is not limited to merely verifying the driver's license and the
vehicle's registration. For one thing, is it common for the officer also
to run a check for any outstanding arrest warrants on the driver.
Indeed, it may fairly be said that such a warrant check has itself
become a "routine" part of the so-called "routine traffic stop"178 that is
undertaken without regard to whether there is any reason to believe
that such a warrant exists or that the driver is engaged in other
criminality.179 Warrant checks are run even when the traffic violation is
nothing more than an unsignaled lane change180 or failure to maintain
proper distance181 (and pedestrians are not immune, as warrant checks
are likewise run incident to stops for jaywalking182). There is

174. United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir. 1997).
175. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1979).
176. The importance of the violation of law to the authority to run a check on a license
and registration is illustrated by those cases holding that if there is a stopping on either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a traffic violation that is determined immediately
after the stop not to have been a violation at all, the officer may not continue the detention
for a license/registration check. See, e.g. , United States v. Mcswain, 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir.
1994); People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1995).
The principle is also illustrated by the holding that if a vehicle is stopped because of a
traffic violation by the passenger for which the driver is not also legally accountable, then
there may be no checking of the driver's license incident to that stop. City of Fairborn v.
Orrick, 550 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). There exists some questionable authority,
however, to the effect that if an officer makes a nonseizure encounter with a parked car, e.g.,
to see if the motorist needs assistance, then this may be followed by a brief seizure to check
the validity of the defendant's driver's license. State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452 (Idaho 1992).
177. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
178. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (characterizing
encounter as "routine traffic stop"); State v. Mogen, 52 P.3d 462 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)
(same); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1994) (same).
179. Occasionally, however, when such suspicion has been present, courts have
emphasized it as justification for the warrant check. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 1
F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1992).
180. State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276 (Kan. 1998).
181. United States v. Lopez-Guzman, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (D. Kan. 2003).
182. United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Barros, 48 P.3d 584
(Haw. 2002). Under the aggressive patrol tactics utilized in some high-crime locales,
pedestrians are stopped for minor violations such as jaywalking and then detained as long as
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considerable variation in the reports as to the time that a warrant
check takes. For those police having computers in their patrol cars, as
is increasingly common,183 it is said that access to the data is "almost
instantaneous,"184 but other reports of the time actually consumed
waiting for a response to a warrants query range from a few minutes185
to ten minutes186 to thirty minutes.187 Of course, it sometimes will be
uncertain whether the driver is actually the same person as is named in
the warrant, in which case still more time will be taken resolving that
question.188

thirty minutes while a warrant check is conducted. See Adrienne L. Meiring, Note, Walking
the Constitutional Beat: Fourth Amendment Implications of Police Use of Saturation Patrols
and Roadblocks, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 528-30 (1993).
183. "Police officers throughout the United States increasingly use computer consoles in
their patrol cars to request immediate information about outstanding arrest warrants, traffic
records, and other matters relevant to their discretionary decisions about whether to
investigate, cite, or arrest the citizens with whom they interact." Christopher E. Smith &
Madhavi McCall, Constitutional Rights and Technological Innovation in Criminal Justice, 27
S. ILL. U. L.J. 103, 114 n.63 (2002).
184. People v. McGaughran, 601 P.2d 207, 216 n.2 (Cal. 1 979) (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting); see also infra note 186.
Even if the response is very quick, dealing with the data received may take some time as
well. Files that are called up on the patrol-car computer contain "a significant amount of
information, including: name, age, sex, race, driving record, traffic violations, warrants,
insurance information, et cetera," but "the information is presented in an extremely hard-to
read format and is normally provided in separate files that force the officer to scan through
several records." Lisa Napoli, Speeding Up Police Traffic Stops, MSNBC, at http://www.aps.
us/news/Speeding.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
185. Piggott v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 618 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
186. People v. McGaughran, 601 P.2d 207 n.6 (Cal. 1979). This was the time actually
taken in this particular case. The Attorney General claimed that "because of modern
communications systems and advances in computer technology the usual response time to a
warrant check is now from a few seconds to less than four minutes, depending on the
method used and the number of inquiries being processed," while the defendant claimed the
ten minutes taken in his case was more typical; the court concluded "that reality lies
somewhere between these two extremes: i.e., that under ideal conditions warrant checks can
now be swiftly completed, but that in a still significant number of places in the state presumably diminishing with the spread of the new technology - the ideal is not yet
attained." Id. at 211.
187. Meiring, supra note 182, at 528-30.
188. U.S. v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 775-76 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that additional
seventeen to twenty-six minutes consumed by a police officer's attempts to verify whether
the defendant was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant did not render the duration
of the initially valid traffic stop unconstitutional, although the warrant was from a county on
other side of the state, date of birth on the warrant did not match the defendant's, police had
run the defendant's name two and one-half months earlier, but had not detected any
outstanding warrants, and warrant was for a worthless check, as opposed to a more "serious"
crime, officer had specific and articulable suspicion that person named in the warrant was
the defendant, method of investigation, a computer check and follow-up teletype was likely
to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, and with a minimum of interference, and scope
and intrusiveness of the detention was relatively minor).
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With rare exception,189 the courts have approved of the general
practice of conducting warrant checks incident to a traffic stop.
Sometimes the expression of approval appears unrestrained, in that it
is made to appear that such a check is simply another proper
procedure, along with the license and registration check, that may
accompany any traffic stop.190 Other courts have been somewhat more
restrained, holding that a warrant check is permissible if it does not
"significantly extend" the period of detention.191 While one case has
been found in which the court actually held that this latter limitation
had not been met,192 it has been cogently questioned whether as a
practical matter this limitation can be enforced.193
Earlier in this Article I have argued, as a general proposition, that
courts should rather strictly adhere to the Terry standard for judging
the lawful dimensions of a traffic stop, so as to remove the incentive
for pretextual arrest and to minimize the intrusion upon the very
substantial numbers of persons who find themselves by the side of the
road after being signaled to stop by a traffic/drug-enforcement officer.
Does this mean that the practice of making warrant checks incident to
traffic stops ought to be abolished, at least absent "specific and
articulable facts causing [the officer] to reasonably suspect that there
may be an outstanding warrant for the driver's arrest"?194 Certainly a
189. In State v. Rife, 943 P.2d 266, 268 (Wash. 1997), the court ruled the warrant check
there was illegal because "[n]either the [applicable] statute nor the Seattle Municipal Code
grants authority for a police officer to run a warrant check after stopping a person for a
routine traffic infraction."
190. E.g., United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia,
205 F.3d 1 1 82 (9th Cir. 2000); State v. Lee, 658 N.W.2d 669 (Neb. 2003); Walter v. State, 28
S.W.3d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
191. E.g., United States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1978); State v. Barros,
48 P.3d 584 (Haw. 2002); Storm v. State, 736 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
192. United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973).
193. As stated in People
concurring and dissenting):

v.

McGaughran, 601 P.2d 207, 216-17 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J.,

This rule is unworkably vague. How is it possible to determine what amount of time would
have been "reasonably necessary" for an officer to discharge the duties he or she had with
respect to the traffic infraction itself? I submit, it is not possible. Further, the rule requires
the officer and the judge to determine the duration of a past event which never occurred,
i. e., the length of time the traffic detention would reasonably have required if the officer had
not run the warrant check. Not only must past history be thus reorganized, but a
determination must be made as to how many of the officer's actions that never occurred
would have been reasonably "necessary" to perform duties that may have been only partly
performed.

In the court's first opinion in McGaughran, a majority of the court expressed similar
reservations: "For a court to decree at a later date precisely how much time 'would have
been' necessary to perform the officer's duties in any given case would be at best hindsight
and at worst sheer speculation." People v. McGaughran, 585 P.2d 206, 215 (Cal. 1978), rev'd,
601 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1979).
194. This was the test very, very briefly in California by virtue of McGaughran, 585 P.2d
206, 208 (1978), until rejected in the court's second opinion in that case, 601 P.2d 207 (1979).
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rather compelling argument can be made in favor of such a change.
For one thing, the point has been made that "[i]nitiating a warrant
check and awaiting the return are not activities that are directed at
resolving the traffic offenses which authorized the stop in the first
place," meaning that this is an obvious case for applying the
limitations of Terry in order that the "scope of a lawful, routine traffic
detention [may] be limited to what is necessary to investigate the
traffic infraction itself" rather than "expanded to permit using a
portion of the detention solely to investigate the separate question of
whether there are unrelated arrest warrants in the name of the
driver."195
So the argument goes, if police are deprived of the windfall of the
serendipitous discovery of persons wanted on outstanding warrants for
a variety of crimes, then they may be less likely to make traffic stops
for marginal conduct. Moreover, such a change would obviate another
problem:
Since a warrant check during a traffic detention does not have to be
justified on any factual basis, the decision as to whether or not to run a
warrant check will turn not upon the driver's apparent involvement in
crime but upon the unconstrained and standardless discretion of the
officer.1 96

While there is much to these arguments, I would not press as hard
for a change in the warrant-check practice, as I would for the changes
later recommended herein. This is because there are at least some
rational arguments for retaining the warrant-check routine as to a
person who apparently has committed a traffic offense.197 For one
thing, to the extent that the warrant check makes it possible to
determine whether the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or
more previous traffic offenses, as happens in a small but perhaps
significant number of cases,198 it can be said that the warrant check
195. People v. McGaughran, 601 P.2d 207, 216 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
196. Id. at 217.
197. Here, as with the license/registration check, see cases cited supra note 176, there is
the question of whether the warrant check may proceed even after it is determined that no
violation occurred. The answer would seem to be no in this context as well. But cf People v.
Safunwa, 701 N.E.2d 1202 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (reasoning, curiously, that the fact that a
number of jurisdictions have held that where the initial traffic stop is valid, police may
request a driver's license and run a warrant check without any further probable cause
supports the court's holding in this case of first impression that where the police were
justified in stopping the defendant's car because they believed he was a fugitive wanted on a
federal warrant, they could detain him to conduct a warrant check even after they realized
that he was not the fugitive).
198. In People v. McGaughran, 585 P.2d 206, 213-14 (Cal. 1978), rev'd, 601 P.2d 207
(Cal. 1979), the court concluded that "2 percent of California drivers - at the very most may be operating with suspended or revoked licenses" and "less than 2 percent" of the
licensed drivers have traffic warrants outstanding. In the second opinion in that case, the
concurring/dissenting opinion noted that "statistics based on all warrant checks run by the
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serves objectives sufficiently related to the initial reason for the stop,
in much the same way as does the license/registration check. For
another, my main argument is that those stopped for traffic infractions
should not receive less Fourth Amendment protection than is afforded
to those subjected to Terry stops because they are suspected of
burglary, robbery, and other typical crimes. At least as to warrant
checks, it can be said that this is likewise a standard practice as to
those in the latter group, where again the check is not limited to a
search for warrants regarding conduct similar to that suspected in the
instant case.199
Yet another type of information regularly acquired by a records
check following a traffic stop is the driver's criminal history, that is,
information regarding his prior convictions, prior arrests, and the like.
This has likewise become a "part of [a] routine computer check"
performed incident to a traffic stop,200 just one of the "routine . . . tasks
related to the traffic violation. "201 Criminal-history information is
readily available to law-enforcement agencies and officers through the
National Crime Information Center,202 and is said to be "instantly
available nationally."203 The cases reflect, however, that obtaining a
criminal-history check is one of several "somewhat time-consuming
tasks related to the traffic violation"204; delays of five minutes in
getting a response back to the officer in the field are not uncommon. 205
The check can easily add to the total length of the stop, for "often
criminal history checks take longer to process than the usual license
and warrant requests."206 Moreover, the criminal-history inquiry may
itself produce a substantial extension of the traffic violator's seizure
without reasonable grounds to suspect more serious criminal activity.
A criminal record, even if previously denied by the violator, counts for
Los Angeles County Sheriff suggest the figures may be somewhat higher. In addition to
disclosing traffic warrants, a warrant check may also reveal felony and misdemeanor
warrants. The information supplied by the Los Angeles Sheriff suggests that felony warrants
are discovered in 1 percent of all warrant checks and nontraffic misdemeanor warrants in 5
percent." 601 P.2d 207, 217-18 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
199. See, e.g. , State v. Holman, 380 N.W.2d 304 (Neb. 1986); State v. McFarland, 446
N.E.2d 1 168 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); State v. DeMasi, 448 A.2d 1210 (R.I. 1982), order
confirmed, 452 A.2d 1 150; State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996).
200. United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
201. United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999); see
also Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 474-75 (Ark. 2001).

202. United States v. McManus, 70 F.3d 990, 991 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995).
203. Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 373 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
204. United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Finke, 85 F.3d 1275 (7th Cir. 1996).
206. Finke, 85 F.3d at 1280.
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very little,207 but yet may lead to interrogation that is "intense, very
invasive and extremely protracted."208
Most courts confronted with the issue have concluded that a
criminal-history check is a valid part of a traffic stop. Sometimes it is
stated flat-out that "a police officer, incident to investigating a lawful
traffic stop, may . . . conduct computer searches to investigate the
driver's criminal history."209 To the same effect are those cases that
"demonstrate an implied acceptance of criminal history checks as
generally reasonable, by beginning their unconstitutional detention
analysis only after the point at which a criminal history report has
been obtained."210 Other cases are a bit more cautious, indicating that
a criminal-history check is proper provided it is "almost simultaneous"
with the license/registration check,211 or if it does not unduly prolong
the length of the traffic-stop seizure,212 although here Gust as with
warrant checks213) it is to be doubted whether in practice this is a
meaningful limitation. Criminal-history checks are run even in the
case of traffic offenses as innocuous as an unsignaled lane change,214
and courts forthrightly acknowledge that they are approving such
checks or even added detention to facilitate such checks "even though
the purpose of the stop had nothing to do with such prior criminal

207. As stated in United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 928 (8th Cir. 2001):
There are numerous reasons why an innocent traveler initially would be reluctant to reveal
to law enforcement authorities his criminal history; primarily for fear that it would have the
exact effect that it had here, i.e., casting unwarranted suspicion upon that person. Also, an
inconsistent answer regarding past conduct is less suspicious than an inconsistent answer
regarding present destination or purpose. An inconsistent answer as to the former might cast
a shadow of dishonesty upon the character of the motorist, but an inconsistent answer
regarding the latter casts suspicion and doubt on the nature and legitimacy of the activity
being investigated.

208. Based upon data accumulated under a 1995 Maryland court order from January
1995 through June 2000 (including a total of 8027 searches, and focusing upon a subset of
2146 searches that occurred on the northern portion of 1-95, from Baltimore to the Delaware
border), it is reported in Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial
Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 685 (2002)
(alterations in original) (quoting CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS TASK
FORCE ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, OPERATION PIPELINE: CALIFORNIA JOINT LEGISLATIVE
TASK FORCE REPORT, at 13-15, available at http://www.aclunc.org/discrimination/webb
report.htrnl (Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter OPERATION PIPELINE]), that in " 'approximately 30
hours of [actual] videotaped stops . . . . [t]he questioning that was done was intense, very
invasive and extremely protracted. It was not uncommon to see travelers spending 30
minutes or more standing on the side of the road, fielding repeated questions about . . . their
criminal histories' " and other matters.
209. E.g. , United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001).
210. Finke, 85 F.3d at 1279 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing illustrations).
211. United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1536 n.6 (10th Cir. 1996).
212. E.g. , United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274 ( 11th Cir. 2001).
213. See supra note 193.
214. State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276 (Kan. 1998).
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history"215 and even though there had not yet developed any
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity.216
Especially in light of that, it would appear, consistent with the
thesis developed earlier in this Article, that there should be a total
prohibition (without regard to whether the check increases the time of
detention significantly or at all) on use of criminal-history checks
incident to traffic stops except when there also exists a reasonable
suspicion of more serious criminal conduct.217 Because in this "war on
drugs" via traffic stops the criminal-history check serves to identify
drivers who deserve (at least in the officer's mind) more intense
scrutiny,218 a prohibition on such checks could contribute in a
meaningful way to reducing the number of pretextual stops as well as
the number of stops in which the motorist is subjected to excessive
scrutiny and detention.
But there is one wrinkle here that makes this issue a bit more
complex: while most courts approving of these criminal-history checks
deem it unnecessary to say even a word by way of justification for such
a conclusion, occasionally a claim is made that criminal-history checks
are legitimate in connection with traffic stops in order to aid in
ensuring the officer's safety.219 This claim can hardly be dismissed out
of hand, for certainly legitimate concerns about officer safety may
warrant some action that would be inappropriate if it were simply a
matter of acquiring evidence of criminal activity.220 But, while it is
doubtless true that "[b ]y determining whether a detained motorist has
a criminal record or outstanding warrants, an officer will be better
appri[s Jed of whether the detained motorist might engage in violent
activity during the stop,"221 it is at least debatable whether routinely
obtaining this information is necessary in light of the various other

215. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001).
216. United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2002).
217. In some cases the court has approved the criminal-history check at issue because
there did exist a reasonable suspicion of more serious criminality, e.g. , United States v.
Finke, 85 F.3d 1275 (7th Cir. 1996); People v. Easley, 680 N.E.2d 776 (111. App. Ct. 1997), an
unobjectionable result.
218. Even though the existence of the criminal history may be attributable to prior
arbitrary traffic stops of the driver! Cf United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass.
1998) (holding that Criminal History Category V over-represented defendant's criminal
record because defendant's driving convictions were the result of pretextual traffic stops or
racial profiling).
219. E.g. , United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Purcell,
236 F.3d 1274 ( 11th Cir. 2001).
220. Perhaps the best illustration of this point is that it quite properly takes less to justify
a frisk of a person already lawfully stopped by the police than it would to justify a stop in the
first instance on suspicion of carrying a concealed weapon. See 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE (1996), supra note 5, § 9.5(a).
221. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221-22.
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rules that exist with respect to what an officer may do in the interest of
his own protection during a stop.222 Given these many other avenues of
self-protection, it would seem that they suffice to ensure the officer's
protection during what should be a brief face-to-face encounter,223 so
that the added authority to run a criminal-history check (which has no
conceivable other legitimate basis during a traffic stop) need not be
granted. If there is doubt on that point, however, this would not mean
that a bright-line rule allowing a criminal-history check incident to all
traffic stops would be necessary;224 rather, this otherwise undesirable
step would be permitted only upon a showing of reasonable
apprehension approaching that needed for a frisk.
Before leaving this general subject of records checking as an
incident of a traffic stop, something should be said about such checks
regarding a passenger in the stopped vehicle. Although it is sometimes
suggested that both the driver and any passengers might be required
to display their driver's licenses incident to a traffic stop,225 this would
not seem to be the case, for applicable statutes do not require "a
passenger in a vehicle to carry his driver's license or any other type of
identification" and do not "attribute liability to a passenger for a
traffic violation committed by the driver, such as 'following too
close.' "226 Of course, if the driver's offense makes him unable to
continue driving and the passenger agrees to take over, then it is

222. These rules permit frisking the driver on reasonable suspicion he has a weapon,
e.g. , Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 1 13 (1998), searching the vehicle on reasonable suspicion
there is a weapon within (even if the driver is not himself in the car!), e.g. , Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and even absent reasonable suspicion of a weapon ordering the driver,
e.g. , Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), or passengers, e.g. , Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408 (1997), out of the vehicle, ordering the occupants to remain within the vehicle,
e.g., Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.
Moorefield, 1 1 1 F.3d 10 (3d Cir. 1997); State v. Roberts, 943 P.2d 1249 (Mont. 1997); State v.
Hodges, 631 N.W.2d 206 (S.D. 2001), ordering the occupants within to show their hands, e.g.,
United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2003); Cousart v. United States, 618 A.2d 96
(D.C. App. 1992), or directing the driver to be seated with the police officer in the patrol car
during the stop, e.g. , United States v. Barlow, 308 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. England,
92 S.W.3d 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Lee, 658 N.W.2d 669 (Neb. 2003) ; State v.
Lozado, 748 N.E.2d 520 (Ohio 2001).
223. It is interesting to note that in United States v. McRae, the danger prompting a frisk
in light of what was learned by the criminal-history check came into being only because the
officer had obtained the driver's consent to a full search of the vehicle; the court emphasized
that "a search of the car might compel Officer Colyar to turn his back on Mr. McRae," and
that because the driver needed to exit the car to facilitate the search "Officer Colyar
permitted Mr. McRae to put on his jacket before getting out of the car, and a j acket is a
likely place in which to store a weapon." 81 F.3d 1528, 1536 (10th Cir. 1996). If consent to
search a vehicle gives rise to a need for a frisk of the person that otherwise would not exist,
one wonders why the frisk should not be expressly included in the requested consent.
224. See United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1 996) (finding "such a
bright line rule troubling" after noting the officer-safety argument in other decisions).
225. State v. Gutierrez, 611 N.W.2d 853 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000).
226. United States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490, 503 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003).
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proper for the officer to require the passenger to display his license,227
but otherwise requiring display of a driver's license by the passenger
may not be required and, indeed, may in some circumstances amount
to an illegal seizure.228 While an officer making a traffic stop, " [i]n
order to do his or her job correctly," should attempt to "determine the
identity of the witnesses to the incident," meaning that "the securing
of names of witnesses" thereto, i.e., passengers, "is part of the scope of
a traffic stop,"229 " [p ]assengers are free to refuse to provide identifying
information,"230 and thus the officer should request rather than
demand such information and should not insist upon a driver's license
to the exclusion of other forms of identification.
It is not uncommon for appellate courts to declare that incident to
a traffic stop it is permissible for the officer to run a warrant check on
the passengers specifically231 or on all occupants of the vehicle,232
although it is sometimes said that detention for this purpose after the
traffic stop is otherwise over is not permissible.233 Putting aside those
cases where the warrant check was upheld because connected with a
driver's license check on a passenger who was to assume the driving
duties,234 it is to be doubted whether there is any valid reason for
automatic warrant checks on mere passengers. If, as suggested earlier,
the best that can be said for requiring a warrant check on the driver is

227. Duncan v. State, 686 So. 2d 1279 (Ala. Crim. App.1996); State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d
1242 (Utah 1994); State v. Mennegar, 787 P.2d 1347 (Wash. 1990).
228. This is certainly the case when, as in Piggott v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 618 (Va.
Ct. App. 2000), the traffic stop of the driver was completed by citation or warning after
which the passenger is required to surrender his credentials. It is less apparent that this is the
case when, in the course of the traffic stop, the officer stands at the passenger door and asks
the passenger for his license, though such was the holding in People v. Spicer, 203 Cal.Rptr.
599 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
229. State v. Jones, 5 P.3d 1012, 1018 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). As stated in State v. Griffith:
(T]here is a general public interest in attempting to obtain identifying information from
witnesses to police-citizen encounters. If witnesses are willing to identify themselves, they
may later be able to assist police in locating the person who violated the law. If questions
later arise about police conduct during the stop, passengers may be able to provide
information about what occurred during the stop.
613 N.W.2d 72, 81-82 (Wis. 2000).
230. Griffith, 613 N.W.2d at 82.
231. State v. Ybarra, 751 P.2d 591 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); United States v. Morris, 910 F.
Supp. 1428 (N.D. Iowa 1995); State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276 (Kan. 1998).
232. United States v. White, 81 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 1996); State v. Anderson, 605 N.W.2d
124 (Neb. 2000).
233. State v. Damm, 787 P.2d 1 185 (Kan. 1990); State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah
1991); Piggott v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 618 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
234. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1994); State v. Mennegar, 787 P.2d 1347
(Wash. 1990). The state relied upon this exception in People v. Harris, but without success,
as at "no time during the traffic stop" did the officer ask the passenger whether he "was able
to drive the car." 802 N.E.2d 219, 222 (Ill . 2003).
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that this is an appropriate step for all those seized, even temporarily,
for violating the law, it hardly follows that companions of the offender
(especially when the offense is only a traffic violation) should be
treated in the same fashion. And thus the correct result as to this issue
is that reached in People v. Harris:235 except when (1) the police "have
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the passenger has committed a
crime," (2) "the passenger has violated a traffic law," or (3) "the
driver and passenger, knowing that the driver is being arrested or is
otherwise incapable of driving, agree that the passenger should drive
the vehicle," a warrant check on a passenger is impermissible because
it would change "the fundamental nature of the traffic stop" by
"convert[ing] the stop from a routine traffic stop into an investigation
of past wrongdoing by" the passenger.236 As for the intimation in some
of the cases that a criminal-history check of a passenger is proper,237
here again a contrary conclusion is supported by the need to obviate
the possibility of a "windfall" that would make a pretextual stop
worthwhile to the police, especially since any police-safety claim is
relatively weak vis-a-vis a passenger.
2.

Questioning Vehicle Occupants

Once a lawful traffic stop has been made, it is certainly proper for
the officer then to engage in "questioning the driver about the traffic
violation,"238 although often the officer's prior observations will have
obviated the need for any interrogation to establish the existence of
the traffic infraction. Given the frequent use of traffic stops for the
purpose of uncovering drugs, it may be just as likely that the officer
will question the driver about the presence of any drugs on his person
or in the vehicle. Such questioning is often "intense, very invasive and
extremely protracted,"239 and the driver may be confronted with a
virtual barrage of questions about drugs and related matters.240 The

235. 802 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. 2003)
236. Id. at 228-230.
237. United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding stop to be proper if
not thereby unreasonably prolonged); State v. DeMarco, 952 P.2d 1276 (Kan. 1998).
238. United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir. 1999).
239. Gross & B arnes, supra note 208, at 685 (quoting OPERATION PIPELINE).
240. E.g. , Maxwell v. State, 785 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In Maxwell,
during what the court termed "a fishing expedition," officer King
asked Maxwell about matters which had nothing to do with the citation . . . . Deputy King
asked over SO questions during this traffic stop. Many of the questions involved drugs or
weapons: Do you have any drugs in the car? When was the last time you used marijuana?
Have you ever been arrested for drugs? Has anyone been in your car recently with drugs?
Do you object to a search of your car? Is there any reason a drug dog would alert to drugs if
it walked around your car? Do you have any objection to the drug dog walking around your
car? Do you have any guns in your car? Have you had any firearms violations?
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questioning is sometimes profitable; the interrogatee may actually
admit to the possession of drugs,241 or his staunch denial may produce
what is deemed consent to a search when the officer responds that
then the driver will not mind if the officer looks in the vehicle.242
Such questioning has been upheld where a reasonable suspicion of
drug transportation had already been lawfully developed,243 which is
hardly objectionable, and where the questioning occurred in a post
stop "consensual encounter,"244 which would be likewise unobjec
tionable but for the unrealistic fashion in which courts typically go
about determining that a traffic-stop seizure has ended (discussed in
Part III below). As for those cases where the questioning about drugs
was during the stop and without a reasonable suspicion about drugs,
one view is that such questioning is permissible provided that it occurs
before the valid purposes of the traffic stop (license/registration check,
ticketing, or warning) have been concluded.245 That is, under those
cases the single issue is whether the seizure had become unlawful in a
temporal sense. This may be easy to determine if the questioning
comes after all the above-mentioned steps have been taken but before
release from custody,246 but if the questioning comes earlier it may be
a matter of some uncertainty. This is because it is often difficult to
determine whether the officer was "stalling" the completion of these
other steps in order to facilitate the questioning.247
Because of the "slippage" possible under this approach, it probably
does not vary from that taken by some other courts, namely, that the
questioning about drugs is permissible so long as it does not
"unreasonably prolong" the detention.248 In the cases taking this view,
typically no explanation is offered as to why it is proper to hold
someone longer than would otherwise be required because some of
the time was taken up questioning the driver about matters totally
unrelated to the traffic stop. But one court, with uncharacteristic
Id. at 1279 (citation omitted).

241. E.g., State v. Toevs, 964 P.2d 1007 (Or. 1998).
242. E.g. , United States v. Erwin, 71 F.3d 218 (6th Cir. 1995).
243. E.g. , United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Jones, 44 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 1994).
244. E.g. , United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2003); People v.
Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174 (Colo. 1992); State v. Ready, 565 N.W.2d 728 (Neb. 1997).
245. E.g., United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Fernandez,
18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994); State v. Gutierrez, 51 P.3d 461 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); State v.
Hight, 781 A.2d 1 1 (N.H. 2001); State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002).
246. As in, for example, State v. Gutierrez, 51 P.3d 461 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002).
247. When the stalling is quite apparent, it may be taken into account by the court, as in

Maxwell v. State, 785 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).

248. E.g., Henderson v. State, 551 S.E.2d 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Parkinson, 1 7
P.3d 301 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); State v . Wallace, 642 N.W.2d 549 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) .
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honesty, stated flat out that the explanation was that a policy of
regularly making such traffic-stop extensions "promotes the public
interest in quelling the drug trade."249
These positions are dead wrong! They are totally at odds with the
Terry line of Supreme Court decisions on the limits applicable to
temporary detentions, and amount to nothing more than an
encouragement to police to engage in pretextual traffic stops so that
they may engage in interrogation about drugs in a custodial setting
(albeit not custodial enough to bring even the protections of Miranda
into play250). The correct rule is that followed by some other courts:
that in strict accordance with Terry and its progeny, questioning
during a traffic stop must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop
and thus may not be extended to the subject of drugs.251
Nor is a different result called for on this issue merely because a
different rule might obtain were the questioning about weapons, a
matter deserving brief exploration here. What the rule should be
about such questioning is a close call, as is reflected by the fact that in
the en bane case of United States v. Holt,252 the court split 5-4 on the
issue. The majority's bright-line rule to allow such an inquiry because
of "the dangers inherent in all traffic stops"253 is grounded in the
notion that ensuring the safety of the police and bystanders is a more
compelling interest than acquiring information of criminality and thus
justifies a variety of minimal intrusions in service of that particular
interest:
In addition to information about loaded weapons that the officer may
obtain from visually looking in the car, shining a light around the interior
of the car, or asking the motorist and occupants to step out of the car or
to keep their hands raised - all procedures authorized by the courts in
the name of officer safety - an officer may also obtain information
about the existence of a loaded weapon by simply asking the motorist if
there is a loaded weapon in the vehicle. Indeed, straightforwardly asking

249. State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 768 (Ohio 1997), rev'd, Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33 (1996). The court's legal analysis in support of the lawfulness of such a position is
truly astounding, as by some curious merger of the holdings in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983), and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the court concluded that these two decisions
"set out a standard whereby police officers, under certain circumstances, may briefly detain
an individual without reasonably articulable facts giving rise to suspicion of criminal activity,
if the detention promotes a legitimate public concern, e.g. , removing drunk drivers from
public roadways or reducing drug trade." Robinette, 685 N.E.2d at 768.
250. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
251. E.g., United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 1995); State v. Syhavong, 661
N.W.2d 278 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); see also Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the
Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1 17, 164-88 (2001) [hereinafter Maclin, Freeway] .
252. 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001).
253. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1226.
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this question is often less intrusive than many of the procedures
authorized by our sister circuits.2 54

The majority went on to emphasize the utility of such inquiry: if the
suspect answers in the affirmative, or even if the suspect either
answers in the negative or refuses to answer in a certain way, the
officer would be provided with "an important piece of information
causing [him] to proceed with greater caution."255 But, as the
dissenters pointed out in objecting to allowing such questioning "in all
future cases,"256 it is precisely because there are many other means
available for ensuring officer safety, including requiring the traffic
violator to exit his vehicle and remain outside during the entire
period of the detention, that such questioning is unnecessary. In an
apparent effort to counter that contention, the majority declares that
once the traffic stop is over and the detainee is free to leave, he will at
that point of necessity be allowed to reenter his vehicle and might at
that point choose to attack the officer. That claim seems just as
fanciful here as it did when made by the Supreme Court in Michigan
v. Long.257
Nor is a different result called for regarding questioning about
drugs simply because many courts have allowed police to inquire into
the driver's travel plans during a stop, for, as one court aptly put it,
even assuming for purposes of argument that these cases allow an officer
conducting a Terry stop to ask a detainee a limited number of questions
unrelated to the purpose of the stop, we are not convinced they allow for
questions . . . which would require the detainee to give[] an incriminatory
answer or which would directly lead to a search of the detainee's
vehicle.258

But these travel-plans cases themselves also require a closer look.
What they say is that inquiry into the driver's travel plans (or, as it is
often put, into the driver's destination and purpose, which, however,
can include quite detailed questioning about precisely where the
driver has been, where he is going, and whom he has seen or will be

254. Id. at 1223.
255. Id. at 1224.
256. Id. at 1239 (Lucero, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (noting also that the "average
American citizen stopped for speeding while hurrying to drop children off at school will not
only find it bizarre, but more than minimally intrusive, to be confronted with questions
about loaded weapons").
257. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). For criticism of that position in Long, see 4 LAFAVE,
(1996), supra note 5, § 9.5(e), at 291 n.233.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

258. United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931, 937 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated en bane, 264 F.3d
1215 (10th Cir. 2001) (reaching majority agreement on the rule regarding interrogation
about drugs).
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seeing, etc.) is "routine"259 and that such questions may be asked "as a
matter of course"260 because they are "reasonably related"261 to the
circumstances justifying the traffic stop. The essence of these cases is
that calling upon the driver to fully explain the past and forthcoming
aspects of his travels is a regular part of the officers' duties whenever
they make a traffic stop.262
Only occasionally do the cases attempt to spell out why under the
"reasonably related" test the questioning about travel plans is
permissible. In State v. Chapman, for example, where the concern was
with "the trooper's initial questions . . . concerning where the
defendants had been and where they were going," the court explained
that " [t]hese inquiries had a substantial nexus to ascertaining the
reasons for Chapman's erratic driving," especially (since intoxication
had been already eliminated) "the possibility of fatigue."263 But that
won't wash, as all the officer needed to know on the fatigue issue, at
best, was how long Chapman had been driving. And even if there is
doubt about that, a case like Chapman hardly supports the broadside
that " [t]ravel plans typically are related to the purpose of a traffic stop
because the motorist is traveling at the time of the stop."264 For
example, Chapman hardly explains why the supposed police right of
inquiry into travel plans has been upheld even when the stop was
made for a loud muffler265 or a just-ended parking violation.266
259. United States v. Long, 320 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. West, 219
F.3d 1 171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000); Miller v. State, 102 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003)
(quoting Laime v. State, 60 S.W.3d 464, 474 (Ark. 2000)).
260. West, 219 F.3d at 1 176 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1499
(10th Cir. 1996)).
261. United States v. Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1 170 (8th Cir. 1998); State v. Lee, 658
N.W.2d 669, 676 (Neb. 2003) (quoting State v. Anderson, 605 N.W.2d 124, 131 (Neb. 2000)
(quoting U.S. v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1994))).
262. See also United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. Fields, 662
N.W.2d 242 (N.D. 2003); cf United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating
that "questions relating to a driver's travel plans ordinarily fall within the scope of a traffic
stop," thus suggesting something short of a bright-line rule).
Of course, in this area as well it is sometimes said that questions about travel plans may
not be asked if they extend the time of detention beyond that otherwise permissible. United
States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2003); Mitchell v. United States, 746 A.2d 877 (D.C.
2000). While, as previously discussed, such a test is not easy to administer where the
questioning did not actually follow completion of all the lawful tasks pursuant to the traffic
stop, Brigham emphasized that in the instant case the officer's "methodology, questioning
unrelated to the traffic violation for eight minutes before commencing the computer check, is
merely an impermissible variation" from the post-completion questioning scenario.
Brigham, 343 F.3d at 501.
263. State v. Chapman, 753 A.2d 1 179, 1 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); see also
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d
910 (8th Cir. 1994).
264. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221 (emphasis added).
265. See United States v. Hephner, 260 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Iowa 2003).
266. See Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001).
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Permitting travel-plans inquiries across the board has been
defended on the ground that the "scope doctrine does not . . . prevent
officers from engaging in facially innocuous dialog which a detained
motorist would not reasonably perceive as altering the fundamental
nature of the stop. "267 But this is a gross misrepresentation of the
situation at issue. The interrogations challenged without success in the
cases have not been social one-liners like "hey, where you headed?"
or "so, where you from?"; rather, they are multi-question extended
inquiries of vehicle occupants into the most minute details regarding
the parts of the journey completed and lying ahead.268 The officers are
"trained to subtly ask questions about . . . their destination, their
itinerary, the purpose of their visit, the names and addresses of
whomever they are going to see," "to make this conversation appear
as natural and routine a part of the collection of information incident
to a citation or warning," and "to interrogate the passengers
separately, so their stories can be compared."269 The objective is not to
gain some insight into the traffic infraction that provided the legal
basis for the stop, but to uncover inconsistent, evasive, or false
assertions that could contribute to reasonable suspicion or probable
cause regarding drugs. Thus, " [n]ot only are questions about travel
plans investigatory rather than merely conversational, the ordinary
traveler cannot reasonably be expected to decline to answer such
questions, particularly if they are posed while an officer is holding the
driver's license and other essential documents."270
As an impressionable lad growing up in the '40s in a sleepy
Wisconsin burg where the local cinema was the principal source of
amusement, I consumed a steady diet of World War II movies, where
I saw essentially the same scene time and again: in some area under
the Nazi thumb, some hapless traveler would be stopped by the
authorities, at which point the man in charge would inevitably say,
"Ve vant to zee your papers." The traveler would produce his
credentials and then would be subjected to a thorough grilling about

267. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1240 (Murphy, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
268. For a striking illustration, see the facts in United States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490,
494-96 (5th Cir. 2003), where, after Trooper Conklin stopped Brigham for not maintaining
sufficient distance from the car preceding him, the officer subjected all the occupants of the
vehicle to an intense grilling about all aspects of their travels.
269. Gross & Barnes, supra note 208, at 685 (quoting OPERATION PIPELINE, supra note
208, at 13).
Passengers are no more immune from interrogation than they are from the other
investigative techniques previously discussed. Passengers may merely be asked their name,
e.g. , People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260 (Ill. 2003), may be asked about travel, e.g. , People v.
Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2003), or may be directly questioned about drug possession,
e.g. , United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002).
270. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002)
(No. 01-1422).
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where he was going, where he had been, why he was about, etc. Each
time I watched such a scene, shivers went down my spine, and it was
then that I concluded that one of the most striking differences
between a free and a totalitarian society was that in the former scenes
like that could not happen. We certainly have come a long way,
unfortunately in the wrong direction!
3.

Obtaining Consent to Search

Yet another technique commonly employed in connection with
drug stops disguised as traffic stops is seeking consent to make a
search. Usually the officer attempts to get the driver to consent to a
search of the vehicle, but sometimes the requested consent will be for
search of the person.271 Requesting consent has apparently become yet
another part of the "routine" of "routine traffic stops,"272 and it is thus
not surprising that the cases contain acknowledgments by police about
the frequency of this tactic.273 These requests result in affirmative
responses in the overwhelming majority of cases.274 Guilty or innocent,
"most motorists stopped and asked by police for consent to search
their vehicles will expressly give permission to search their vehicles,"
resulting in "thousands upon thousands of motor vehicle searches of
innocent travelers each year."275 This is apparently attributable to the
training police have received in the art of acquiring what will pass for
consent,276 plus the fact that many factors often present in this setting
produce an affirmative response.277
271 . A request for search of the person may also be directed at a passenger. See, e.g.,
State v. Hardyway, 958 P.2d 618 (Kan. 1998).
272 See State v. Ready, 565 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Neb. 1997) (quoting an officer's
testimony that he "routinely" seeks consent to search following traffic stops).
273. See, e.g. , United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 649 (4th Cir. 1 996) (discussing
officer's recorded statement that he searches "97 percent of the cars I stop"); State v.
Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 503 n.3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (noting 786 requests to search
vehicles made by testifying officer in one year and expressing concern over the "staggering"
numbers of Ohio citizens affected).
274. One study showed that consent was given in about ninety percent of the cases. See
Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality,
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 507, 533-35 (2001) (discussing Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or
Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry Into the "Consensual" Police-Citizen Encounter (1999)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University)).
275. Whorf, Consent Searches, supra note 18, at 2. This article and its companion piece,
Robert H. Whorf, "Coercive Ambiguity" in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned Consent Search,
30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379 (1997), examine in detail the traffic stop/consent search
phenomenon.
276. In the words of Professor Whorf:
The "right" technique is by now well-established and is likely a frequent subject of Jaw
enforcement training in "drug interdiction." It goes like this: A police officer stops a vehicle
for a routine traffic violation such as speeding; the police officer asks the driver to get out of
the vehicle; the police officer chats in a friendly way with the driver and, sometimes, with
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When the resulting search turns up drugs, the courts deal with the
validity of the police action in seeking the consent in much the same
way as they do with the other techniques previously discussed.
Consent requests made during the course of the traffic stop are
generally deemed proper,278 at least if the request itself did not
unjustifiably delay the conclusion of the stop279 and was not preceded
by "stalling"280 or earlier investigative efforts (e.g., interrogation about
drugs) that caused improper delay.281 On the other hand, any consent
obtained will not be valid if the request came after the traffic stop had
or should have run its course,282 unless by the time of the request there
was reasonable suspicion of drug activity283 or circumstances changing
the situation to that of a "consensual encounter."284 Because it
typically takes little time to obtain consent, courts are inclined to
validate consent requests that immediately follow completion of all
other traffic-stop activities.285 If the officer legitimately sought the

passengers as well; the police officer issues a warning rather than a citation for the traffic
offense; the police officer asks if the vehicle contains anything illegal; and then, right on the
heels of the inevitable denial, the police officer asks for permission to search the vehicle.
Whorf, Consent Searches, supra note 18, at 2-3 (citations omitted).
277. Again, as Whorf puts it:
There are plausible explanations for the ready acquiescence to search by the "guilty": 1) the
overall coercive nature of the routine traffic stop turned consent search; 2) the technique of
catching the motorist off-guard by the quick transition from traffic stop to contraband
investigation; 3) the possible belief by consentors that well-concealed contraband will not be
found; 4) the possible belief by consentors that if they readily acquiesce, police suspicion will
be dispelled resulting in a cursory search or in no search at all; and 5) the likely belief by
consentors that, if they refuse consent, police suspicion will be heightened resulting in a
forcible search.
Id. at 22 n.121.

278. E.g., United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001); People v. Reddersen,
992 P.2d 1 176 (Colo. 2000).
279. See State v. Johnson, 5 1 P.3d 1 112, 1 116-17 (Idaho App. 2002).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding search
illegal and consent invalid where officer employed "dilatory tactic" of delaying handing over
of warning ticket).
281. See, e.g United States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490, 501 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding search
illegal earlier where officer engaged in "questioning unrelated to the traffic violation for
eight minutes before commencing the computer check"). This panel decision, however, has
been set for rehearing en bane. United States v. Brigham, 350 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 2003).
.•

282. United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002); Harris v. Commonwealth,
581 S.E.2d 206 (Va. 2003).
283. See, e.g. , United States v. Carrate, 122 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 1997); Heincelman v.
State, 56 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App. 2001).
284. See, e.g., United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1 171 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Chan, 136 F.3d 1 158 (7th Cir. 1998); State v. Hardyway, 958 P.2d 618 (Kan. 1998); State v.
Williams, 646 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 2002).
285. See, e.g. , United States v. Carrazco, 91 F.3d 65, 66 (8th Cir. 1996) (validating
request that came three seconds after delivering warning ticket); State v. Kremen, 754 A.2d
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consent, chances are the consent itself will be upheld as being
voluntary .286
Here again, the failure of most courts, when dealing with traffic
stop consent searches, to adhere to the Terry limits on what
constitutes a reasonable temporary detention has produced very
distressing results. Consent searches are no longer an occasional event
by which a crime suspect may "advise the police of his or her wishes
and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding,"287 but are
now a wholesale activity accompanying a great many traffic stops,
submitted to by most drivers, guilty or innocent, and resulting in
continued interruption of their travels for a substantial period of
time288 while they wait by the roadside as their vehicles are ransacked,
a process which beyond question "is highly invasive of the dignitary
interests of individuals. "289 Certainly the best way to deal with this
problem is as in State v. Fort,290 which involved a traffic stop for
speeding and a cracked windshield. The court quite correctly held that
the officer's "consent inquiry . . . went beyond the scope of the traffic
stop and was unsupported by any reasonable articulable suspicion,"291
meaning the evidence obtained via the consent must be suppressed,
without regard to whether the inquiry and subsequent search "may
also have extended the duration of the traffic stop."292

964, 968 (Me. 2000) (holding that officer, after writing ticket, may still pursue "a simple
request for permission to search a vehicle").
286. Courts holding these consents valid are sometimes inclined to overlook rather
convincing evidence of coercion, such as that the defendant was threatened that if he did not
consent, a drug dog would be summoned to sniff the vehicle. See, e.g., United States v.
Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 1996); Cole v. State, 562 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
This would suggest that State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn. 1997), is correct in
concluding that the nature of traffic-stop consents is such that appellate courts should give
those consents more "careful review." Indeed, it may be that the concept of voluntariness
should be looked at differently in this context. One commentator has asserted that in the
common case of a police-citizen encounter followed by a purported consent to search upon a
police "request," the "question should be whether the officer's behavior was too coercive
given the reason for the encounter," e.g., "the reasonableness of treating [the citizen] like he
was a probable drug courier." William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1064-65 (1995). Another has argued that this wholesale
seeking of consents that are almost always given and then almost always upheld by the
courts means it is time for the "drastic solution" of eliminating consent searches entirely.
Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 271 (2001).
287. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
288. "A typical vehicle search for drugs is likely to last twenty to forty minutes or
more." Whorf, Consent Searches, supra note 18, at 19.
289. Id.
290. 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003).
291. Fort, 660 N.W.2d at 419.
292 Id. at 419 n.l. A slightly different approach, with essentially the same benefits, is
that taken in State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 905 (NJ. 2002), namely, "that, in order for a
consent to search a motor vehicle and its occupants to be valid, law enforcement personnel
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Sniffing by Drug Dogs

Especially in recent years, it seems that a good many of the officers
making a traffic stop either have a drug dog with them initially293 or
else are able to summon one to the scene in short order.294 That being
the case, a not uncommon tactic these days in police efforts to use
traffic stops as a means of drug interdiction is to lead a drug dog
around the detained vehicle to see if the dog will "alert."295 This
process can be carried out rather quickly - in "no more than two
minutes,"296 and in some instances in "20, 30 seconds at the most."297 If
the dog should alert, this is deemed to establish probable cause that
the vehicle contains drugs, j ustifying an immediate full search of it.298
The courts have responded to the use of drug-sniffing dogs in
connection with traffic stops much as courts have responded to the
other investigative techniques previously discussed. First of all, if the
detention was continuing299 or had been resumed300 when the sniff
occurred but the time had run out on the traffic-stop detention either

must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing prior to seeking
consent to search a lawfully stopped motor vehicle."
293. See, e.g., State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); State v. DeLaRosa, 657
N.W.2d 683 (S.D. 2003).
294. See, e.g., Lecorn v. State, 832 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002). The mere act of
summoning a drug dog to the scene is within the total discretion of the officer, and this step
is not subject to a reasonable-suspicion limitation or any other such requirement. State v.
Carlson, 657 N.E.2d 591, 594 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
295. Ordinarily the drug dog remains outside the vehicle, though occasionally the dog
enters it. Compare United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he dog's
instinctive actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment" as there was "no evidence . . .
that the police asked Stone to open the hatchback so the dog could jump in. Nor is there any
evidence the police handler encouraged the dog to jump in the car."), with United States v.
Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding a search where a drug dog
jumped through an open door and alerted to a vent inside the car and deeming Stone
"inapposite" because here, unlike in Stone, "the officers themselves opened the door,"
making apparent a "desire to facilitate a dog sniff of the van's interior").
296. Box, 73 P.3d at 629.
297. Bradshaw v. State, 759 N.E.2d 271, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting an officer's
testimony).
298. United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999); State v.
Tucker, 979 P.2d 1 199, 1201 (Idaho 1999).
299. Cf Box, 73 P.3d at 629 (holding that a traffic-stop detention had ended, and a post
detention consensual encounter had begun, when the officer "returned appellant's
documents to him and handed him the written warning, [and] appellant was free to leave").
300. Even if the events otherwise clearly indicate a termination of custody (e.g., the
officer tells the driver he is "free to go"), if the officer then announces that a drug dog has
been summoned to do a sniff of the vehicle, this amounts to a new and illegal seizure, for
anyone who was "present when a canine unit had been summoned to the scene and was then
told by (the officer] that he was going to have a canine unit conduct a drug sniff of [the] car"
would not "reasonably have felt free to leave." United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1 129, 1135-36
(8th Cir. 1998).
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because its immediate lawful objectives had been accomplished301 or
because they had not been accomplished only because of stalling (a
likely tactic when a drug dog has been summoned from some distance
and has not yet arrived302), then the dog sniff and its fruits are all
suppressible consequences of the illegal detention,303 unless of course
the continuation of the detention beyond its otherwise lawful limits
was justified by the existence of reasonable suspicion of drug
possession.304 But precisely because the dog sniff itself takes so little
time, courts in this context have been especially willing to employ a
"fudge factor" regarding the temporal limits of the traffic stop; if the
dog sniff is conducted immediately after completion of those tasks
actually connected with the traffic violation, the resulting additional
custody is deemed so de minimis as to be of no consequence.305 Such
cases are thus treated like those in which the use of a dog on the
vehicle is upheld because it occurs within the proper time of the traffic
stop, that is, before the citation has been issued306 or before a return
has been received on the radio or computer check regarding the
license, registration, and outstanding warrants.307
Here as well, it may be concluded that the appellate courts have,
for the most part, missed the mark completely on the matter of drug
sniffing dogs used in connection with traffic stops. There should be no
need for the complex and often nearly impossible task of calculating
just when the time should be deemed to have expired in the case of a
particular traffic stop and, often, the equally bedeviling task of
heading down the slippery slope to determine just how much extra
time after the proper ending of the traffic stop should be excused on
some de minimis theory. Rather, the central point is that use of a drug
sniffing dog has absolutely nothing to do with the traffic infraction that
served as the sole justification for the stop in the first place,308 and for
301. See, e.g. , Dukes v. State, 753 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Damato v. State,
64 P.3d 700 (Wyo. 2003).
302. Maxwell v. State, 785 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Cox, 782
N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ill. 2002).
303. United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 ( 10th Cir. 1997); State v, Fields, 662 N.W.2d
242 (N.D. 2003).
304. United States v. Bailey, 302 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2002); Wilson v. State, 822 A.2d 1247
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. Box, 73
P.3d 623 (Ariz. 2003).
306. Lecorn v. State, 832 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2002); State v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 301 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2000).
307. Rogers v. State, 560 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Wilkes v. State, 774 A.2d 420
(Md. 2001).
308. With the arguable exception of those instances in which the stop is grounded in a
reasonable suspicion that the driver is operating the vehicle under the influence of some
controlled substance.
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that reason alone should not be permitted at all. Allowing the dogs to
be used serves only as a positive encouragement for police to engage
in pretext and subterfuge, hardly a defensible move given the common
knowledge that traffic-law enforcement has been diverted from its
justified objectives to serve as a means for seeking out drugs.309
Allowing use of the drug dogs at all in conjunction with traffic stops
can only encourage the making of stops for insignificant and technical
violations on the basis of unarticulated suspicions and mere hunches
or, at worst, on totally arbitrary and discriminatory bases. Moreover,
allowing use of the dogs at all adds to the process another decision,
whether to summon a drug dog, that the cases indicate requires no
reasonable suspicion nor, for that matter, any justification whatso
ever,310 but that the practice indicates is also likely to be made on an
arbitrary basis.311
In justification for the status quo, it is stated that these drug-dog
sniffs of vehicles do not constitute Fourth Amendment searches312 and
that "the presence of a single drug detection dog does not necessarily
intensify the level of detention. "313 It is true that such use of a drug dog
is no search; the Supreme Court so held in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond,314 but that did not stop the Court from concluding that use of
drug dogs in a checkpoint context violated the Fourth Amendment
when incident to a stopping of vehicles having the sole lawful basis of
enforcing the traffic laws.315 In the case of individualized traffic stops,
309. By like reasoning, it has been cogently argued that "the only way to assure that a
[traffic-law-enforcement] roadblock is adopted for permissible reasons is to deny the use of
drug sniffing dogs or any similar devices whose only purpose is to search for drugs." Stephen
Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 133, 154 (2003).
310. See supra note 294. But see People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ill. 2002)
(indicating that one court was greatly troubled by the summoning of a drug dog in the
absence of any suspicion whatsoever).
311. When the Orlando Sentinel studied the operations of the Criminal Patrol Unit of
the Orange County Sheriff's Office, "a special patrol squad that uses routine traffic stops to
search for narcotics," it found upon reviewing the "records of more than 3,800 stops by the
Unit" that "black drivers represented 16.3% of the drivers stopped," but accounted for
"more than 70% of the canine searches." Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment,
51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 352-53 (1998) (discussing Roger Roy & Henry Pierson Curtis, When
Cops Stop Blacks, Drug Search Often Follows: Orange County Deputies Deny Race Plays a
Role in Stops on the Turnpike, But Some Police Officials Agree Blacks Have a Right to Be
Unhappy, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 8, 1997, at Al).

312. United States v. Gregory, 302 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. Box, 73 P.3d
623 (Ariz. 2003).
313. State v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000).
314. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
315. The only difference between Edmond and the situation here under discussion is
that there the stoppings were without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any traffic
law offense, albeit pursuant to the operation of a checkpoint assuring against any of the
arbitrariness that is possible in case-by-case traffic stops. Given that distinction, it might well
be argued that the use of drug dogs incident to individualized stops is worse than incident to
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the question again is not whether any of the drug-seeking tactics are
themselves Fourth Amendment searches, for the point is that they
taint the stop purportedly made only for a traffic violation because
they have absolutely no relationship to traffic-law enforcement.
Moreover, even if it is true that the use of drug dogs in this context is
not a search, surely such conduct is close to the line, considering that it
is quite different from "the sniffing of inanimate and unattended
objects"316 that courts have typically approved, as in the Supreme
Court's initial embrace of dog sniffing in United States v. Place, where
the absence of "embarrassment" was emphasized.317 In short, the
presence of the dog at a traffic stop does intensify the level of the
detention.318 Yet another relevant consideration is that drug dogs are
not infallible, so that their employment in instances where there is not
a prior reasonable suspicion that drugs are present will result in a
much higher number of false positives and, in tum, total ransacking of
vehicles containing no contraband.319
For all these reasons, the correct result is that reached in State v.
Wiegand,320 where, after a defendant's vehicle was stopped for a
burned-out headlight, one officer walked a drug dog around the
vehicle while another officer was writing out the ticket. The court
concluded that this did not constitute a search under either the federal
or state constitution, and also noted that the defendant did not argue
that the stop in this case lasted too long, but nonetheless ruled in the
defendant's favor. Proceeding step by step, the court reasoned (1) that
"the Terry principles are appropriately applied in this case"; (2) that
" Terry authorizes us to balance the nature and quality of the intrusion
into the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests as stake"; (3) that "there is
some intrusion into privacy interests by a dog sniff"; and (4) that
consequently the Fourth Amendment requires "a reasonable,

a checkpoint operation, especially since targeting a particular vehicle for a publicly
conducted sniff on the roadside is accusatory in nature.
316. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1026 n.4 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
317. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
318. Which explains why a state court might conclude that a drug dog's sniffing of an
automobile stopped for a traffic infraction constitutes a search under the state constitution,
as in People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666 (Colo. 2001). Also noteworthy is that other states have
found sniffing by drug dogs to be a search under their state constitutions in a broader set of
circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); People v. Dunn, 564
N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990).
319. "The judiciary should be most skeptical of sniffs conducted in a random, unfocused
manner. All but the most carefully planned random sniffs using highly-trained dog teams will
likely result in many false detections." Robert C. Bird, An Examination of the Training and
Reliability of the Narcotics Detection Dog, 85 KY. L. J. 405, 432-33 (1997).
320. 645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002).
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articulable susp1c10n of drug-related criminal activity before law
enforcement may conduct a dog sniff around a motor vehicle stopped
for a routine equipment violation in an attempt to detect the presence
of narcotics. "321
III.

THE FINISH: FROM SEIZURE TO "CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER"

Whether or not limitations of the kind proposed in Part II are in
place, it sometimes happens that the police are unable to complete
their drug investigation by the time that the traffic stop has reached
the point where all the steps properly taken into account in
determining how long it may go on have been completed. This running
of the time often does not represent a substantial obstacle to
continuing the investigation because of the availability of yet another
"routine" (used this time to mean both "a regular course of
procedure" and "a carefully rehearsed act"322). All the officer has to
do to obviate any and all time and scope limitations is to perform in
such a manner that courts are likely to treat as manifesting a
termination of the seizure even though any person who has been
detained for a traffic violation is unlikely to so perceive the situation.
In many jurisdictions, this is rather easy to bring off; all it calls for is
the well-known Lt. Columbo gambit ("one more thing . . . ").323
Illustrative is United States v. Lattimore,324 where a trooper stopped
Lattimore for speeding and then had him sit with the officer in the
patrol car during ticketing. After issuing citations and returning
Lattimore's driver's license, and while Lattimore was still in the patrol
vehicle, the trooper began questioning Lattimore about the presence
of narcotics or any contraband in his vehicle, which Lattimore denied.
The officer then requested and obtained Lattimore's oral consent to
search the vehicle. In rejecting Lattimore's claim that his consent was
obtained during an illegal extension of the traffic stop, the appellate
court stated:
Trooper Frock did not question Lattimore concerning the presence of
narcotics or contraband in his automobile, or request permission to
search it, until after the officer had issued the citations and returned
Lattimore's driver's license, indicating that all business with Lattimore
was completed and that he was free to leave. During the subsequent
conversation between Trooper Frock and Lattimore, "a reasonable

321. Id. at 133-35. A more recent decision in accord with Weigand, People v. Caballes,
802 N.E.2d 202 (III. 2003), is headed for the Supreme Court. Illinois v. Caballes, 124 S. Ct.
1875 (2004) (granting cert.).
322. 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 172 (2d ed. 1989).
323. See Columbo, Nostalgia Central.com, at http://www.nostalgiacentral.com/tv/cops
/columbo.htm (last visited June 2, 2004).
324. 87 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 1996).
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person would have felt free to decline the officer['s] requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter."325

Various other federal and state courts have taken essentially the same
approach,326 grounded in the common assumption that there is a "clear
line . . . between police-citizen encounters which occur before and
after an officer returns a person's driver's license, car registration, or
other documentation."327 But, while it is true that mere interrogation
does not bring about a seizure that otherwise did not exist,328 it is hard
to swallow the conclusion in Lattimore that returning one's credentials
with a citation or warning ticket sufficiently manifests a change in
status when immediately followed by interrogation.329
Rather, the realities of the situation were appreciated much more
clearly in State v. Robinette,330 a case that involved quite similar facts.
Robinette was stopped for speeding, after which the deputy asked for
his driver's license and took it back to the squad car to check it; the
deputy then had Robinette exit his car and stand between the two
vehicles, where his reactions could be taped by the video camera in the
squad car, which the deputy then activated. The deputy then returned
Robinette's license and gave him a verbal warning, following which he
delivered an ungrammatical version of the Lt. Columbo gambit,
saying: "One question before you get gone [sic]: are you carrying any
illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs,
anything like that?"331 When Robinette denied having any such items,
the deputy then sought and obtained Robinette's consent to a search
of his car, which uncovered drugs. In concluding that the consent had
been obtained during an illegal seizure rather than during a post
seizure consensual encounter, the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned:
The transition between detention and a consensual exchange can be
so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has occurred.
The undetectability of that transition may be used by police officers to
coerce citizens into answering questions that they need not answer, or to
allow a search of a vehicle that they are not legally obligated to allow. . . .
Most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody
as long as the officer continues to interrogate them. The police officer

325. Id. at 653 (quoting the test in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)).
326. E.g., United States
N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 2002).

v.

West, 219 F.3d 1 171 (10th Cir. 2000); State

v.

Williams, 646

327. United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1993).
328. Florida
(1983).

v.

Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Florida

v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497

329. For a more detailed criticism of that conclusion, see Maclin, Freeway, supra note
251, at 131-64.
330. 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
331. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696 (alteration in original).
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retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the
officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most
citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the
officer continues to address him.. ..
Therefore, we are convinced that the right, guaranteed by the federal
and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure in one's person and property
requires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by
the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention,
before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any
attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase "At
this time you legally are free to go" or by words of similar import.332

While the Ohio court's judgment was thereafter reversed in Ohio
Robinette,333 this should not be taken to mean that the United States
Supreme Court has embraced the Lattimore approach, as compared to
that in the middle paragraph in the above quotation, on what it takes
to transform what was admittedly a seizure into nothing more than a
consensual encounter. This is because the Court was snookered by the
state of Ohio into considering only the issue set out in the state's
certiorari petition - as the Court phrased it, "whether the Fourth
Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised
that he is 'free to go' before his consent to search will be recognized as
voluntary."334 That is, the Supreme Court remarkably proceeded to
decide a question which was really not in the Robinette case at all and
had not even been mentioned by the state court,335 and in the process
managed to avoid entirely the important issue the state court had
taken on: whether a traffic offender somehow becomes "unseized"
upon return of his license notwithstanding a continuation (albeit on a
different subject) of police discussion with the stopped driver.336
On the voluntary-search issue, all members of the Court in
Robinette expressed agreement that the Fourth Amendment does not
require that a lawfully seized person be advised he is "free to go"
v.

332. Id. at 698-99.
333. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
334. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35.
335. Actually, the lower court did assert at one point that "[t)he burden is on the state to
prove that the consent to search was voluntarily given," State v. Robinette, 653 N.E .2d at 698
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)), but it is readily apparent that this was not
intended as a characterization of the matter at issue, for in both the preceding and following
sentences the court makes clear that the matter under consideration in the instant case was
not whether the consent was voluntary or not but rather whether, even if voluntary, it was
the fruit of an illegal seizure.
336. As aptly stated by Dery, "[t)he crucial issue missed in Robinette dealt not with the
resulting consent, but with the continuing seizure. By failing to target the correct question,
the Court missed the opportunity to clarify an area of the law suffering from uncertainty."
George M. Dery III, "When Will This Traffic Stop End": The United States Supreme Court's
Dodge of Every Detained Motorist's Central Concern
Ohio v. Robinette, 25 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 5 1 9, 565 (1998).
-
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before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. This is
hardly surprising. As the majority in Robinette pointed out, the state
court had adopted a per se rule, an approach generally disfavored by
the Supreme Court, which has "consistently eschewed bright-line
rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the
reasonableness inquiry" (except, of course, when the bright line favors
the prosecution rather than the defendant337). Moreover, in the
seminal case on the consent-search voluntariness test, Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, the Court had rejected as "impractical" a proposal of
another kind of warning as a prerequisite to a voluntary consent,
namely, a caution that defendant had a right to refuse the request.338
This made it easy for the Court to say in Robinette that it would
likewise be "unrealistic to require police officers to always inform
detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be
deemed voluntary."339
The most perverse aspect of the misdirection in Robinette is that
lower courts have tended to read the case as embracing the Lattimore
approach,340 when in fact the analysis summarized above speaks only
to the voluntariness issue and says nothing whatsoever about the more
significant issue presented by the Lattimore genre of cases: whether
the prior, lawfully commenced seizure did not end when it should
have, so that the consent to search, albeit voluntary, is an inadmissible
fruit of an illegal seizure. Only Justice Stevens thought it appropriate
to talk about the latter issue, and his analysis deserves careful
attention, for he correctly states how the Lattimore line of cases ought
to be handled. As Stevens notes in his dissent, under the Court's
decisions the seizure issue is to be resolved by asking whether "a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."341 A reasonable motorist in the defendant's shoes in Robinette
would have so believed, Stevens points out, considering the fact that
the officer never told defendant he was free to leave, the additional
337. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39. For example, just two months after Robinette the
Court endorsed a pro-prosecution bright-line rule on requiring passengers to exit stopped
vehicles in Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
338. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973).
339. Ohio

v.

Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40.

340. See, e.g. , United States v. Chan, 136 F.3d 1158, 1 159 (7th Cir. 1998) (contending
that under Robinette, whether the "lack of a clear break in the process . . . made the consent
involuntary" or "converted the traffic stop, initially lawful, into an unlawful arrest . . . are
just two ways of making the same argument, and should not affect either analysis or
outcome"); State v. Ready, 565 N.W.2d 728, 732-33 (Neb. 1997).
Some courts have been more perceptive, as in People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 563
(Ill. 1999) (observing correctly that the "continued-detention issue" in the instant case
"requires consideration independent from Robinette," which "does not speak to the issue of
taint").
341. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 ( 1980).
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questioning and request for consent was sought, in the officer's
language, "before you get gone," and defendant was at that time
standing in front of a video camera in response to an official
command. Indeed, it would take less than that to give rise to such a
reasonable belief; as the Supreme Court put it earlier in Berkemer v.
McCarty, "few motorists would feel free . . . to leave the scene of a
traffic stop without being told they might do so."342 Indeed, one of the
facts that emerged in Robinette strongly reinforces that conclusion, as
Stevens explained:
The fact that this particular officer successfully used a similar method of
obtaining consent to search roughly 786 times in one year . . . indicates
that motorists generally respond in a manner that is contrary to their self
interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to surrender that
interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis other than
an assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so.343

It is thus nonsensical for courts to continue their embrace of the
Lattimore position that a reasonable motorist, having been seized,
would conclude he was free to leave (even though not told so) in the
face of ongoing police interrogation. The police know this is not so,
which is why materials prepared by the police for public
consumption344 and for use nationally in driver's education training345
state unequivocally that a motorist subjected to a traffic stop is not
free to leave until expressly told so by the officer. And thus, as some
courts have learned, judges should instead ask when not even a notice
from the officer that the motorist is free to leave can carry the day
because circumstances suggesting otherwise are also present.346
IV.

SOMEFINALREFLECTIONS

What we have seen in this look at "routine traffic stops" from start
to finish is that in terms of what may start the process, what is deemed

342. 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984).
343. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 48 (citations omitted).
344. For example, on one website a police department maintains to inform the public
about traffic stops, the question, "when is the stop over?" is answered as follows: "The traffic
stop is over, when the Officer tells you that you are free to go." WEST UNION POLICE DEP'T,
TRAFFIC STOPS, at http://www.wupd.com/traffic_stops.htm (Dec. 9, 2002).
345. For example, a police-prepared lesson plan for driver's education students,
distributed nationally by the National Association of School Resource Officers, includes this
point under the heading: "During the Stop/Contact with the officer": "Can not leave until
officer tells you that you are free to go." Officer Ken Teppel, Bolingbrook Police Dep't,
Lesson Plan for Conducting a Unit of Instruction in "What is Going to Happen If You Are
Stopped for a Traffic Violation" 4-5, at http://www.nasro.org/members/lessons/stoppedfora
trafficviolation.doc (June 23, 2000).
346. See, e.g. , State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997); Commonwealth v.
Freeman, A.2d 903 (Pa. 2000); State v. Ballard, 617 N.W.2d 837 (S.D. 2000).
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to end the process, and virtually everything in between, most state and
federal courts have applied Fourth Amendment principles in a loose
and illogical fashion, thus facilitating use of the traffic stop by law
enforcement as a readily available mechanism for at least appearing to
win347 some battles in the war on drugs. Stops are permitted across the
board on nothing more than reasonable suspicion and without regard
to the pretextual or arbitrary nature of the process by which traffic
violators are selected for "the treatment." That treatment is one that
permits police to engage in many investigative activities incident to the
stop that serve no purpose other than as an attempt to uncover drugs,
contrary to the Terry limits on stops that obtain in other areas of law
enforcement. And then there is the end of the stops, the fact that a
traffic stop is deemed to have morphed into a mere "consensual
encounter" in circumstances where any reasonable traveler would
believe he was still under the control of the police. And all this has
been allowed to occur notwithstanding the common knowledge that
law enforcement has co-opted the traffic stop and transmogrified it
into a mechanism for random and often overbearing quests for drugs,
a fact that would seem to call for strict rather than loose application of
Fourth Amendment standards.
In a recent lecture to federal judges, Professor Stephen Saltzburg
commented upon "a combination of disturbing trends" he saw in the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment decisions:
First, there is the tendency of the Supreme Court to pretend that the
world we all know is not the world in which law enforcement operates.
To be blunt, I contend that the Supreme Court has offered opinions that
strain to describe human nature and typical behavior and rely upon
beliefs and reactions of ordinary people to fit the world that law
enforcement wishes the Court to believe is real. Whether the Court is out
of touch with the world in which most people live or is blinking and
winking to aid law enforcement probably does not matter. Decisions that
do not correspond to the world in which most people live threaten to
undermine the integrity of the judicial system.
347. It is open to serious discussion, however, whether drug enforcement via traffic
stops is having any real effect:
The entire war on drugs is fraught with ambiguity and ambivalence, and many commentators
have concluded that the effort to reduce drug consumption by limiting supply is doomed to
failure. We need not reach this question, however, because the specific program at issue is
ineffective by any standard. Fishing for drug couriers in the immense stream of cars on
interstate highways is a hopeless strategy for eliminating drug trafficking; it probably has no
impact whatsoever on drug markets.

Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under A ttack, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1431 (2002) (citations omitted).
Moreover, whatever impact it does have is probably offset by the costs in terms of
damaged police-citizen relations, considering that " [f]or many law-abiding citizens their only
contact with the criminal j ustice system is via interaction with the police, predominantly
during traffic stops." Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (N.D.
Ill. 2000).
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Second, the Court has been too quick to adopt "bright line" rules in
an effort, supposedly, to provide more guidance to law enforcement.
There are two principal problems with these rules. One is that bright line
rules that are divorced from the rationale for action never provide as
good guidance as the rationale itself. The other problem is that the
Fourth Amendment's place in the Bill of Rights strongly suggests that, if
bright line rules are to be adopted, they should protect the constitutional
rights of citizens rather than promote police efficiency.
Third, there are recent signs that the Court is hinting to law
enforcement that it can escape the Fourth Amendment's restrictions if it
offers phony explanations for actions. In other words, if law enforcement
is honest about its intentions, the Fourth Amendment may inhibit
actions; but, if law enforcement is willing to offer a false defense of its
actions, it may escape the limitations of the Fourth Amendment. These
signs are troubling because the Court ought never to be encouraging
governmental subterfuge.
Fourth, the Supreme Court's tolerance of pretext searches and
seizures may well provide more deference to law enforcement than any
civilized system should. The result may be to provide too much discretion
to law enforcement and to intrude unnecessarily upon the privacy of less
powerful members of society.
These four trends are related to one another. They suggest a judicial
straining to aid law enforcement and an undervaluing of the Fourth
Amendment protection of privacy and freedom from government
intrusion. 348
I not only share that view, but would say in addition that this is
also a fair description of the actions of most of the state and federal
judiciary with respect to the so-called "routine traffic stop." The
courts' views of how little it takes to produce a post-stop consensual
encounter are grounded in nothing else than a very distorted view of
the "reactions of ordinary people" caught up in a traffic stop. The
rules on traffic stops as laid down (or at least as enforced) by the
courts are nothing more than a series of "bright lines" giving police
authority to do certain things in connection with all traffic stops that,
at best, might be reasonable under very unique circumstances.
Moreover, allowing prohibited drug stops to be sanitized by calling
them traffic stops is a prime example of the j udiciary assuring police
that "phony explanations" are the way around the Fourth
Amendment. And certainly the "tolerance of pretext searches and
seizures" that lies at the heart of the traffic-stop-for-drugs
phenomenon "does provide more deference to law enforcement than
any civilized system should."

348. Saltzburg, supra note 309, at 133-34 (citations omitted) (originally presented as a
lecture to the National Symposium for United States Court of Appeals Judges, in
Washington, D.C. on October 21, 2002,).
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While police are sworn to uphold the Constitution, they are, after
all, "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."349 It is thus perhaps not too surprising that, in the course of
their attempts to stem the drug traffic, the police have been so
relentless in pushing their claimed authority relating to traffic stops to
the absolute limits.350 But it is sad, to say the least, that so many judges
have served as ready and willing accomplices in these excesses,
thereby treating the Fourth Amendment as largely an irrelevancy in
the context of "routine traffic stops." Surely the one hundred ninety
million licensed drivers in this country,351 subjected to the millions
upon millions of traffic stops made annually,352 are entitled to more
than this.

349. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
350. As Justice Jackson noted in his dissent in Brinegar v. United States, "the extent of
any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret
and apply themselves and will push to the limit." 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
351. "There were 190,625,023 licensed drivers in the United States in 2000." OFFICE OF
HIGHWAY POLICY INFORMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., LICENSED DRIVERS, at http://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/onh2p4.htm (last modified Feb. 14, 2003).
352. There are apparently no national figures on the number of traffic stops. In
v . Wilson, Justice Stevens noted that over one million traffic stops were made in
Maryland alone in a single year. 519 U.S. 408, 419 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Maryland

